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Protectable “Art”:  
Urinals, Bananas, and Shredders 
Richard Chused* 
 
Creative souls have long played with our imaginations, as well 
as our tastes, about what art may be. The resulting absurdist, dada, 
and everyday object art forces us to step back and ask a few intell-
ectual property questions about what this art has done, undone,  
or reconstructed in the copyright world. The Copyright Act grants 
protection to “original works of authorship fixed in any tangible 
medium of expression, now known or later developed, from which 
they can be perceived, reproduced, or otherwise communicated, 
either directly or with the aid of a machine or device.” This Article 
explores how pranksterism, eccentricity, repackaging of ordinary 
objects, and decay can be subsumed within legal categories of 
copyright law like originality, fixation, protectable two- or three-
dimensional art, and moral rights. 
Taking concepts from the history of art, from modern notions  
of visual perception, and from recent developments in the under-
standing of random motion, this Article unravels copyright conun-
drums involving artistic use of everyday objects. Three artists are 
highlighted: Marcel Duchamp, who created art by placing a  
urinal on a pedestal; Maurizio Cattelan, who recently hung slowly 
decaying bananas at an exhibition; and Banksy, who inserted a 
shredder in a composition’s frame and activated it at an auction. 
 
* Professor of Law, New York Law School. I’d like to thank New York Law School for its 
continuous support of my writing endeavors. Thanks also to Jacob Sherkow, my one-time 
colleague now on the faculty at the University of Illinois, who read an earlier draft and 
passed along some fascinating comments. The same kudos go to my present colleague 
Richard Sherwin, a scholar always brimming with provocative and interesting questions. 
And of course, my artist wife Elizabeth Langer, who continually presents and provokes 
fascinating questions about the content and nature of aesthetic experience. 
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Comparing the work of these three provocative artists with a  
variety of other well-known creative souls leads to the conclusion 
that Duchamp’s urinal, Cattelan’s creation of instructions for 
taping a banana to a wall, and Banksy’s integration of a shredder 
into the frame of a two-dimensional work are fully protected as 
copyrightable works. 
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INTRODUCTION 
During the last century and the early decades of our present era, 
the art world exploded in fanciful and wonderful ways. Three 
memorable examples make this point: Marcel Duchamp’s The 
Fountain—a urinal set atop a pedestal;1 Maurizio Cattelan’s banana 
caper The Comedian—a banana attached to a gallery wall with duct 
tape (that later was removed and eaten by the mischievous David 
Datuna);2 and Banksy’s shredding prank at a Sotheby’s auction in 
 
1 The famous Fountain is typically attributed to Marcel Duchamp. However, the idea 
may have belonged to a woman named Baroness Elsa von Freytag-Loringhoven. See Siri 
Hustvedt, A Woman in the Men’s Room: When Will the Art World Recognise the Real Artist 
Behind Duchamp’s Fountain?, THE GUARDIAN (Mar. 19, 2019), https://www.theguardian. 
com/books/2019/mar/29/marcel-duchamp-fountain-women-art-history [https://perma.cc/ 
XG43-UXG9]. There certainly is contrary, or at least doubtful, commentary on the matter 
as well. See The Fascinating Tale of Marcel Duchamp’s Fountain, PHAIDON (May 26, 
2016), https://www.phaidon.com/agenda/art/articles/2016/may/26/the-fascinating-tale-of-
marcel-duchamps-fountain/ [https://perma.cc/DQ8D-433D]. 
2 Robin Pogrebin, Banana Splits: Spoiled by Its Own Success, the $120,000 Fruit Is 
Gone, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 8, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/12/08/arts/design/ 
banana-removed-art-basel.html [https://perma.cc/79XZ-KCE9]; Jason Farago, A 
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2018—a shredder installed in the frame of a two-dimensional work 
and surreptitiously activated at an auction of the work.3 
Creative souls have long played with our imaginations, if not our 
tastes, about what art may be. The resulting absurdist, dada, and 
everyday object art forces us to step back and ask a few intellectual 
property questions about what this art has done, undone, or 
reconstructed in the copyright world. The Copyright Act grants 
protection to “original works of authorship fixed in any tangible 
medium of expression, now known or later developed, from which 
they can be perceived, reproduced, or otherwise communicated, 
either directly or with the aid of a machine or device.”4 This Article 
explores how pranksterism,5 eccentricity, repackaging of ordinary 
objects, and decay can be subsumed within legal categories—such 
as originality, fixation, protectable two- or three-dimensional art, 
and moral rights—of the Copyright Act.6 
By way of introduction, consider an event much less widely 
heralded as art than the works of Duchamp, Cattelan, and Banksy. 
In 2016, two visiting teenagers found the art on display at the San 
 
(Grudging) Defense of the $120,000 Banana, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 8, 2019), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2019/12/08/arts/design/a-critics-defense-of-cattelan-banana-
.html [https://perma.cc/CN32-AZGZ]. Cattelan also hit the front pages after installing a 
solid gold, functioning toilet in one of the restrooms at the Solomon R. Guggenheim 
Museum in New York City. America by Maurizio Cattelan, available at GUGGENHEIM 
MUSEUM, https://www.guggenheim.org/exhibition/maurizio-cattelan-america [https:// 
perma.cc/9QQ3-MQBQ]. The toilet was later moved to the Blenheim Palace, the birthplace 
of Winston Churchill, in Woodstock, Oxfordshire, England, and was apparently stolen on 
September 14, 2019. Alex Marshall, What Happened to the Stolen Gold Toilet?, N.Y. 
TIMES (Nov. 20, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/11/20/arts/design/gold-toilet-
america.html [https://perma.cc/G3EN-CUBE]. 
3 Scott Reyburn, Banksy Painting Self-Destructs After Fetching $1.4 Million at 
Sotheby’s, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 6, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018//06/arts/design/ 
uk-banksy-painting-sothebys.html [https://perma.cc/3CGB-385C]; Scott Reyburn, How 
Banksy’s Prank Might Boost His Prices: ‘It’s a Part of Art History,’ N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 7, 
2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018//07/arts/design/banksy-artwork-painting.html 
[https://perma.cc/K9PL-ZWDF]. 
4 Copyright Act of 1976, 17 U.S.C. § 102. 
5 For an interesting commentary on Banksy, art, and pranksterism, see Anna Tichy, 
Banksy: Artist, Prankster, or Both?, 64 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. (forthcoming 2020). 
6 Copyright protection exists in original works of authorship fixed in a tangible medium 
of expression. 17 U.S.C. § 102. Authors gain protection against infringers for two- and 
three-dimensional works of art, and many of them also obtain moral rights to prevent the 
mutilation or destruction of their works. 17 U.S.C. §§ 101, 106A. 
2020] PROTECTABLE "ART" 169 
 
Francisco Museum of Modern Art7 to be simple minded. They 
decided to emulate that simplicity by placing a pair of eyeglasses on 
the floor directly beneath other artwork hanging on the wall.8 The 
move generated a surprising variety of responses from visitors—as 
shown in a few of the photos displayed by the teenagers, Kevin 
Nguyen and TJ Khayatan—and on Twitter.9 A number of the social 
network’s users found this episode more amusing than creative after 
the pictures circulated on the Internet.10 Two of the images are 
shown below. 
 
 
  
 Although this event certainly had a humorous side, it raised 
important legal questions. What, for example, is the legal status of 
the spectacles on the floor? Placing the eyeglasses on the floor 
 
7 Christopher Mele, Is It Art? Eyeglasses on Museum Floor Began as Teenagers’ 
Prank, N.Y. TIMES (May 30, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/05/31/arts/sfmoma-
glasses-prank.html [https://perma.cc/9SHR-MNSS]. 
8 Id. 
9 Id. Others not shown here also are available online. 
10 Id. 
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certainly was an original gesture. But many may not consider this 
original for copyright purposes because the teenagers did not add 
anything new to or alter the spectacles themselves. 
While I find the gesture delightfully original, it takes a bit of 
work to reach that conclusion under the copyright statute. The 
spectacles were fixed in a tangible medium of expression, but the 
artists had little if anything to do with creating or fixing the object 
of attention—the eyeglasses. Perhaps, therefore, they did not 
express anything. Ultimately, I conclude that the spectacles were 
both fixed and expressive, though as with originality, reaching that 
conclusion is not straightforward. There are complex questions 
about whether the placement of the eyeglasses was a work of two- 
or three-dimensional artistic expression within the meaning of the 
Copyright Act. Furthermore, what would have happened if someone 
had stomped on the glasses and smashed them to smithereens? The 
teenager whose spectacles were ruined certainly would have had a 
viable tort claim for damage to his property. But would they be able 
to bring intellectual property claims as well for mutilation or 
destruction of a work of visual art?11 This Article explores 
eyeglasses and other memorable artistic moments using several 
prominent and some lesser known examples.12 
 
 
 
 
 
 
11 See 17 U.S.C. § 106A. 
12 The analysis proceeds entirely under the Copyright Act of 1976, even though a 
number of the artworks discussed here appeared before that act went into effect on January 
1, 1978. The new act completely reconstructed critical components of copyright law. For 
example, a work is now considered “created” at the moment of fixation rather than at the 
moment of publication with notice, and the requirements for a copyright to exist have 
generally been altered. See generally 17 U.S.C. § 101. These changes mean that it makes 
little sense to reconsider the artworks in this article under statutory terms that largely went 
into the dustbin of history about half a century ago. That approach obviously fudges the 
analysis, but the goal of this Note is to think about the flexibility and malleability of the 
extant code, and to wonder about where the present rules may allow us to venture. 
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I. ORIGINALITY: URINALS 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Louise Nevelson, Big Black (1963) 
  
 Let’s begin with the sculptural work of Louise Nevelson, known 
for arranging standard and decorative wood pieces into truly original 
works.13 Many of the objects she placed in her works were useful 
during their initial manufacture or incorporation into building 
construction projects. Nevelson found or acquired them, cut some 
of them into pieces, and converted them into parts of unusual 
sculptural works.14 Despite the nondescript, useful nature of many 
of the pieces when they were at lumber yards, ornament stores, 
construction sites, or salvage lots, Nevelson’s artistic vision allowed 
them to be assembled in a wholly new, creative, and original way.15 
 
13 See Louis Nevelson, Big Black, available at MUSEUM OF MOD. ART., 
https://www.moma.org/collection/works/81177 [https://perma.cc/9FLZ-FPQ7]; see also 
Louis Nevelson, ART STORY, https://www.theartstory.org/artist/nevelson-louise/ 
[https://perma.cc/M7SV-RKSG]. 
14 See Louis Nevelson, supra note 1313. 
15 Id. 
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While she worked within the twentieth century movement—made 
famous by Duchamp’s use of ordinary, everyday objects for artistic 
purposes—her intention from the outset was to strip the pieces of 
any useful pretense and reconfigure them into a form recognized as 
artistic by many, if not all, viewers.16 Nevelson turned discernably 
ordinary items used daily by carpenters and furniture makers into 
aesthetic constructs, rather than setting them up as standalone 
objects for placement in galleries or museums.17 By altering and 
assembling them into compositions lacking any pretense of utility, 
she simply used everyday objects as compositional elements.18 
The assemblage qualities of Nevelson’s works point to the nub 
of the copyright problems surrounding Duchamp’s use of a 
standalone urinal as an artistic subject. Ordinary objects, like those 
used by Nevelson, are clearly part of a newly composed original 
work. But everyday articles totally visible in their ordinary, standard 
configurations may not be original copyrightable works if they do 
not qualify on their own as a sculpture.19 These articles seem to be 
simply discernible and practically available for use in everyday life. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
16 See id. 
17 Id. 
18 Id. 
19 If useful items have aspects that may be separated from their utility, then the  
pieces may quality as sculpture. See 17 U.S.C. § 101. The statute defines a sculptural works  
as follows: 
“[T]hree-dimensional works of fine, graphic, and applied art…art 
reproductions…globes… [and] models…Such works shall include 
works of artistic craftsmanship insofar as their form but not their 
mechanical or utilitarian aspects are concerned; the design of a useful 
article, as defined in this section, shall be considered a…sculptural 
work only if, and only to the extent that, such design 
incorporates…sculptural features that can be identified separately 
from, and are capable of existing independently of, the utilitarian 
aspects of the article.” Id. 
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Marcel Duchamp, Fountain (1917)20 
 
 Does this same conclusion govern the state of intellectual 
property rights in Duchamp’s Fountain? Did anything change 
dramatically when the urinal was placed on a stand and put in a 
photograph studio for others to “admire” as an object of art in its 
own right? In contrast to Nevelson, Duchamp changed the object in 
apparently minor and perhaps mundane ways.21 The only easily 
discernible and major change was the urinal’s location. 
 
20 This image is the now famous photograph of the original version of The Fountain, 
taken by Alfred Stieglitz in 1917. Marcel Duchamp Fountain by Alfred Stiegliz, available 
at WIKIPEDIA, https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Fountain_(Duchamp)#/media/File:Marcel_ 
Duchamp,_1917,_Fountain,_photograph_by_Alfred_Stieglitz.jpg 
[https://perma.cc/JEW3-AP2R]. This version of the piece dropped out of sight shortly after 
this picture was taken and has not been seen since. See Fountain by Marcel Duchamp, 
available at TATE MUSEUM, https://www.tate.org.uk/art/artworks/duchamp-fountain-
t07573 [perma.cc/28EE-QKRP]. A number of replicas have been made and are now housed 
at major museums. Id.  
21 However, as will be seen shortly, those apparently minor alterations of the urinal may 
be quite meaningful and significant. See infra p. 182. 
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Are there any important intellectual property differences 
between a urinal on a warehouse storage shelf waiting for a buyer, 
one that is installed and in use in a standard bathroom location,  
or one on an art gallery pedestal?22 If the intention of the person 
making such a move to a gallery was to morph the object into a 
“design” or a “sculpture” for viewing and contemplation rather  
than mere presentation of an object of complete utility, were there 
legal consequences? 
Compare the urinal to the eyeglasses on the floor of the San 
Francisco Museum of Art. The same questions may be posed there. 
At times, spectacles speak with a utilitarian voice—as when placed 
on the head of a person needing eye corrections or in a display  
case at an optometrist’s emporium. But the voice surely changes 
when they are placed in a solitary fashion on a museum floor under- 
neath a painting or other artwork. Given the intentions of the young 
men who deployed the spectacles, the glasses then became an 
aesthetic project. 
But now, you say, how can kids messing around in a museum be 
artistic? Think twice. We all know of “one-hit-wonders” in the pop 
 
22 One could ask identical questions about other works of Duchamp or other artists using 
everyday objects. Two years before The Fountain was created in 1915, Duchamp also 
“made” In Advance of the Broken Arm—simply a snow shovel he hung in his studio. See 
In Advance of the Broken Arm, in MUSEUM OF MOD. ART, https://www.moma.org/ 
collection/works/105050 [https://perma.cc/ST2R-NJR5] [Hereinafter Broken Arm]. The 
original, like the first urinal, is lost, but it has been replicated. Id. One copy is at the 
Museum of Modern Art. Id. This is the museum’s description of the piece: 
Beginning in 1913 Duchamp challenged accepted artistic standards by 
selecting mass-produced, functional objects from everyday life and 
designating them as works of art. These sculptures, which he called 
“readymades” were aimed at subverting traditional notions of skill, 
uniqueness, and beauty, boldly declaring that an artist could create 
simply by making choices. Duchamp purchased the first version of this 
work in a hardware store in 1915, signed and dated the shovel, and 
hung it on display from his studio ceiling. Its title, In Advance of the 
Broken Arm, playfully alludes to the objects intended purpose. 
Id.; see also Marcel Duchamp, In Advance of the Broken Arm or Shovel, in TOUS-FAIT, 
https://www.toutfait.com/unmaking_the_museum/Shovel.html [https://perma.cc/G243-
EGB8]. 
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music world.23 Surely that can happen in the art world as well—even 
when just spectacles are involved. It’s called inspiration. We can’t 
explain it, but we know it’s real. One of the most famous works in 
the world of American art is Grant Wood’s American Gothic. He 
created other paintings, but this is by far the most memorable.24 Or 
perhaps Maya Lin’s Vietnam Memorial better fits the bill.25 Lin 
never completed any noteworthy works before winning the 
commission.26 It was pure inspiration arising from a student project 
on funereal architecture that led to her opportunity.27 It shocked the 
architecture world when it was announced that a student crafted the 
winning design, as hundreds of other architects, including many 
very well-known practitioners, were bested.28 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
23 There are many online lists of the best hit songs by a singer or group that never made 
another popular tune. See, e.g., Gabbi Shaw, The 57 Best One-Hit Wonders of All Time, 
INSIDER (Feb. 24, 2020), https://www.insider.com/best-one-hit-wonders-2018-5 
[https://perma.cc/UTQ8-QWXF]. 
24 American Gothic is in the collection of the Art Institute of Chicago. See Grant Wood, 
American Gothic, at ART INST. CHI., https://www.artic.edu/artworks/6565/american-gothic 
[https://perma.cc/TKP4-C5WZ]. 
25 Christopher Klein, The Remarkable Story of Maya Lin’s Vietnam Veterans Memorial, 
BIOGRAPHY (May 14, 2020), https://www.biography.com/news/maya-lin-vietnam-veterans-
memorial [https://perma.cc/HD6F-KU72]. 
26 Id. 
27 Id. 
28 See Student Wins War Memorial Contest, N.Y. TIMES (May 7, 1981), 
https://www.nytimes.com/1981/05/07/us/student-wins-war-memorial-contest.html 
[https://perma.cc/7SYR-563V]. 
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Claes Oldenberg, Typewriter Eraser (1976) 
 In each of the three urinal settings—warehouse, restroom, and 
gallery pedestal—the object itself was the same. In that regard, it is 
quite different from Claes Oldenburg’s standalone emulations of 
everyday objects, such as the eraser pictured above.29 Oldenburg did 
not cut objects like Nevelson or move commercially purchased 
objects to a potentially significant place. Instead he made large, 
oversized mockups of manufactured items and often placed them in 
visible locations for public viewing.30 They became humorous and 
outrageous. These creations represented a substantial change in 
appearance and scale. By fashioning the eraser,31 Oldenburg created 
 
29 See Oldenburg’s ‘Typewriter Eraser’ Sculpture on Display, LIVEAUCTIONEERS (Mar. 
27, 2013), https://www.liveauctioneers.com/news/top-news/art-design/oldenburgs-type 
writer-eraser-sculpture-on-display-in-ny/ [https://perma.cc/T8G6-6ECS]. This picture was 
taken in 2013 when the piece was available for private purchase from Christie’s auction 
house in New York. Id. 
30 See Claes Oldenburg, THE ART STORY, https://www.theartstory.org/artist/oldenburg-
claes/ [https://perma.cc/9HAA-8JQM] 
31 Id. 
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a dramatic reconfiguration of an item that, in its small utilitarian 
state, was once an office staple. Unlike the urinal, Oldenburg’s art 
objects were obviously not utilitarian. 
Although some copyright limitations make it difficult to claim 
protection in works like Fountain, there are also oft cited cases that 
might lead to the opposite conclusion.32 The Copyright Act states 
clearly that concepts, ideas, and facts are not protected.33 They are 
the structural building blocks for civil discourse and therefore 
ineligible for copyright protection.34 Similarly, items such as blank 
canvases hung on a museum wall or painted in one single color may 
be such basic parts of artistic building blocks, that no property rights 
should inhere in them. How can any artist declare a blank canvas to 
be art and still meet the traditional originality standard requiring 
imposition of some creativity on an object obtain protection? The 
requisite level of creativity may be minimal in degree, but there must 
still be some creativity present; as Justice O’Connor noted in Feist 
Publications, Inc. v. Rural Telephone Service Co.: 
Original, as the term is used in copyright, means only 
that the work was independently created by the 
author (as opposed to copied from other works), and 
that it possesses at least some minimal degree of 
creativity. . . . To be sure, the requisite level of 
creativity is extremely low; even a slight amount will 
suffice. The vast majority of works make the grade 
quite easily, as they possess some creative spark, “no 
matter how crude, humble or obvious” it might be.35 
This notion is echoed in another renowned case—Alfred Bell v. 
Catalda Fine Arts—involving the copyrightability of mezzotints 
intended to reproduce famous works as closely as possible, where 
the Second Circuit noted: 
Accordingly, we were not ignoring the Constitution 
when we stated that a ‘copy of something in the 
 
32 See Glenn Cheng, The Aesthetics of Copyright Adjudication, 19 UCLA ENT. L. REV. 
113, 127–30 (2012) (discussing arguments for both sides). 
33 See 17 U.S.C. § 102(b). 
34 See, e.g., Feist Publ’ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 347–58 (1991). 
35 Id. (citations omitted). 
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public domain’ will support a copyright if it is a 
‘distinguishable variation’; or when we rejected the 
contention that ‘like a patent, a copyrighted work 
must be not only original, but new’, adding, ‘That is 
not . . . the law as is obvious in the case of maps or 
compendia, where later works will necessarily be 
anticipated.’ All that is needed to satisfy both the 
Constitution and the statute is that the ‘author’ 
contributed something more than a ‘merely trivial’ 
variation, something recognizably ‘his own.’ 
Originality in this context ‘means little more than a 
prohibition of actual copying.’ No matter how poor 
artistically the ‘author’s’ addition, it is enough if it 
be his own.36 
These well-known and oft quoted passages require some 
minimum intervention by an artist upon an object to qualify as an 
original, and therefore copyrightable, work. Placement in a location, 
upon a display stand, or on the wall of a museum does nothing 
notable to the object itself. Presumably, Justice O’Connor would 
have trouble protecting Duchamp’s work. The only possible 
intimation of originality was the artist’s endeavor—intent if you 
will—to change perceptions about the everyday nature of the object 
in the minds of those who view it by placing it in a location that it 
never or rarely occupied before. Suggesting that any object—even a 
urinal—may take on aesthetic pretensions undermines prior 
understandings about what constitutes art, challenges artists to think 
in wholly different ways about the nature of their enterprise, and 
forces viewers to think more broadly about art’s outer limits.37 
Those notions form the basis for a claim of originality in works 
such as The Fountain. Given the importance of that work’s public 
 
36 Alfred Bell & Co. v. Catalda Fine Arts, Inc., 191 F.2d 99, 102–03 (2d Cir. 1951) 
(citations omitted). 
37 This sort of claim has, of course, been subject to humorous gibes. See, e.g., Ardell 
Padenom, Art is Anything You Can Get Away With, PADENOM (May 14, 2011), 
http://ardellpadenom.blogspot.com/2011/05/art-is-anything-you-can-get-away-with.html 
[https://perma.cc/Q3MR-B4F5]. Andy Warhol has often been quoted as saying “Art is 
anything you can get away with,” but the crack actually originated with Marshall McLuhan. 
Id.  
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display in the history of art, it would be surprising, to say the least, 
if copyright law did not protect it. And why should physically 
altering an object itself be the sine qua non of originality? Finding 
original, and in most of these cases totally new ways, to conjure up 
aesthetic judgments in the minds of viewers is just as imaginative—
maybe more so—as physically modifying a preexisting object,  
using an artistic substance to make a new work, or mimicking a pre-
existing classic. For artists, placement of works in particular 
locations or adjacent to other objects is often a key element of 
“making” or “completing” the works themselves.38 Observers in a 
modern art museum, like the spectacle pranksters at the San 
Francisco Museum of Modern Art,39 might find the art silly or 
deserving of mockery. They might say, “Gee, I can do that.” But 
those museum visitors were not the first people to create this art!  
It took creative souls like Duchamp, Cattelan, or Banksy to chal-
lenge preexisting aesthetic norms. These innovators were creative 
and skeptics should give credit where it is due. 
Granting Fountain protection may seem unusual but doing so 
actually falls within the copyright mainstream. The best examples 
of this may be books treated as factual works after their authors 
present claimed they were true historical accounts, even though 
virtually all reputable historians found them to be fictional. 
Hoehling v. Universal City Studios, Inc. highlights this pheno-
menon.40 In 1962, A. A. Hoehling wrote Who Destroyed the 
Hindenburg?, claiming the final segments of the volume were a 
factual account of the sabotage that downed the large German 
dirigible.41 When others later used Hoehling’s account in books and 
movies, he sued for copyright infringement and lost.42 The court 
concluded that if an author presents an historical interpretation of a 
 
38 See Richard Chused, Moral Rights: The Anti-Rebellion Graffiti Heritage of 5Pointz, 
41 COLUM. J.L. & ARTS 583, 599 (2018) (making a similar argument about large 
assemblages of street artworks at major street sites). 
39 See Mele, supra note Error! Bookmark not defined.Error! Bookmark not defined. 
(identifying the action of teenagers Kevin Nguyen and T.J. Khayatan placing eyeglasses 
on the floor of the San Francisco Museum of Modern Art). 
40 Hoehling v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 618 F.2d 972, 978 (2d Cir. 1980). 
41 See id at 975. 
42 See id at 977. 
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story as factual, it will be treated that way in a copyright dispute.43 
Because facts, like ideas, are not copyrightable,44 and his claim 
involved copying of his story-line but not the way it was expressed, 
Hoehling’s infringement allegation could only fail. It may have 
taken a bit of chutzpah for Hoehling to make an untrue. In that vein, 
Hoehling certainly was no different from Duchamp, Banksy, or 
Cattelan. His claim of creative license, however, caused him to lose 
his case. In many settings, creativity is seen as out-rageous, silly, or 
boldly beyond the capacity of society to accept. This often is just the 
sort of thing that the law of creativity ought to protect! Creativity is 
what provokes reactions in the minds of viewers and readers—
exactly what one would expect good visionary work to elicit. 
There are many prominent examples of the impact an author’s 
frame of mind has on the scope of copyright protection. Consider 
Mark Rothko’s acclaimed Chapel at the Menil Collection in 
Houston,45 or the display of Monet’s Water Lilies paintings at the 
Musée de l’Orangerie in Paris.46 In each case, artists collaborated 
with architects to place a well-conceived array of related works in 
spaces that fulfilled the painters’ preferences about how best to 
present their work to the public. Moving one of Rothko’s paintings 
out of The Chapel or one of Monet’s pieces out of l’Orangerie would 
crush their artistic goals. To reject protection of works like The 
Fountain is to cast off twentieth, and now twenty-first century, 
artistic trends incorporating artistic placement and juxtapositions of 
works as crucial features of the works themselves. After all, compo-
sition is an essential element in painting. Surely, similar consider-
ations should be taken into account when placing a painting amid 
other related works. Using the creator’s intent as an influential factor 
in settings similar to Duchamp’s novel displays of readymade ob-
jects makes a great deal of sense. 
But relying on intent also creates innumerable challenges. Was 
the placement of the eyeglasses on the floor of the San Francisco 
 
43 See id at 978–79. 
44 See 17 U.S.C. § 102(b). 
45 See ROTHKO CHAPEL, http://www.rothkochapel.org/learn/about/ [https://perma.cc/ 
J9MU-YDF4]. 
46 Claude Monet’s Water Lillies, MUSÉE DE L’ORANGERIE, https://www.musee-
orangerie.fr/en/article/claude-monets-water-lilies [https://perma.cc/9HX6-9QHT]. 
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Museum of Art intended as art, a prank, or both? Is answering that 
question even important? Can humor and irony be embedded in 
artistic works? How can intention, meaningful to copyright law, be 
distinguished from a frame of mind with no particular significance? 
How important are the reactions of viewers to the notion of what art 
may be? 
Similarly, was Banksy’s insertion and use of a shredder 
embedded in the frame of a work sold at auction a statement of 
artistic intent or a remarkable prank?47 Or what of Cattelan’s banana 
taped to a gallery wall?48 Does Justice O’Connor’s objective desire 
to discern physical differences imposed by an artist upon an object 
or a work need changing to take subjective goals into account?49 In 
short, discerning intent is a slippery task at best. Indeed, rather than 
describing Duchamp’s intention as an inspiring tale about 
undermining traditional aesthetics by treating everyday objects as 
artistic, philosopher Steven Hicks50 describes Duchamp in a cynical, 
if not perverse way: 
The artist is not a great creator—Duchamp went 
shopping at a plumbing store. The artwork is not a 
special object - it was mass-produced in a factory. 
The experience of art is not exciting and ennobling - 
at best it is puzzling and mostly leaves one with a 
sense of distaste. But over and above that, Duchamp 
did not select just any ready-made object to display. 
In selecting the urinal, his message was clear: Art is 
something you piss on.51 
 
47 See Reyburn, supra note 3.  
48 See Pogrebin, supra note 2. 
49 See Feist Publ’ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 345–46 (1991). 
50 Hicks is in the Philosophy Department of Rockford University in Rockford, Illinois, 
and is the university’s Executive Director of the Center for Ethics and Entrepreneurship. 
See Campus Directory, ROCKFORD UNIV., https://www.rockford.edu/campus-
directory/hicks-stephen/[https://perma.cc/63T5-FP6B]. 
51 See The Fascinating Tale of Marcel Duchamp’s Fountain, supra note 1. According 
to this essay, the work was actually “pissed” on. Id. 
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Claims have been made that The Fountain was indeed urinated 
on.52 
Hicks forces us to ask whether intent fulfilling the originality 
requirement may be tongue in cheek, harshly dismissive of trad-
itional artistic understandings, or both? Or must intent present some 
aesthetic judgment? Will placing spectacles on the floor of a 
museum or taping a rotting object on a museum wall, like the banana 
in Cattelan’s The Comedian, come with the requisite frame of mind? 
Much celebrated art reached this lofty state by breaking new 
ground—using a different technique, a new sense of perspective, an 
abstract form presented in a new way, or a portrayal of figures or the 
human condition in a new way. Legal norms should encourage the 
art world to recognize new aesthetic theories that provide important 
commentary on human experience. Intent need not be directly 
related to a particular art object but simply to technique, culture, or 
expectations about the behavior of art viewers. Most such shifts 
have easily fallen into the copyright basket. If this is what intent 
requires, then Duchamp’s work more than qualifies. 
All these questions about intent require one more look at The 
Fountain. There actually was one, perhaps obvious, alteration to the 
urinal—the addition of the cryptic “R Mutt 1917” drawn scrawled 
on its lip.53 That and other aspects of The Fountain may make the 
originality issue much easier to resolve. First, the whole episode 
might simply be a spoof or a parody of then extant artistic practices. 
In that sense, it was like Cattelan’s The Comedian except that 
Duchamp’s humor was more subtle. Humor is well protected as ori-
ginal for copyright purposes.54 If humor or irony was part of 
Duchamp’s motivation or part of the spectacle event in San 
Francisco, then it has long been honored with protectable status.  
A funny new joke certainly meets the originality standard. Humor 
even enjoys a privileged status in fair use law—parody, for example, 
typically takes some material from the preexisting work it mocks, 
 
52 See When Brian Eno & Other Artists Peed in Marcel Duchamp’s Famous Urinal, 
OPEN CULTURE (Sept. 24, 2015), http://www.openculture.com/2015/09/ 
when-brian-eno-other-artists-peed-in-marcel-duchamps-famous-urinal.html 
[https://perma.cc/Q5743LHE]; The Fountain, supra note 1. 
53 See Marcel Duchamp’s Fountain, supra note 1.  
54 See Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 597 (1994). 
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but courts consistently recognize its transformative nature in 
analyzing fair use.55 Additionally, the Supreme Court recognized 
parody as a special and widely accepted form of originality.56 It is 
important to note that Duchamp was associated with a group of 
provocative artists, including Francis Picabia, intent on satirizing 
and undermining traditional artistic norms.57 
Other theories about Duchamp’s artistic goals for The Fountain 
have been suggested. There are, for example, claims that “R. Mutt” 
was a pseudonym adopted by Baroness Elsa von Freytag-
Loringhoven.58 There are some who think the Baroness was behind 
the use of a urinal by Duchamp.59 Additionally, there are important 
scholarly art history essays arguing that the piece was deeply sensual 
or closely related to early twentieth century homoerotic debates. For 
example, William Camfield, in a thorough essay on The Fountain, 
provided both another explanation for the cryptic “R Mutt 1917” 
inscription and argued persuasively that the piece carried erotic 
overtones.60 When the urinal was submitted to the American Society 
of Independent Artists for inclusion in its first show in 1917, it was 
turned in under the name of Richard Mutt.61 Camfield also noted the 
sensual curves of the item when it was removed from practical use 
and placed in a “prone” position;62 he contended that Duchamp 
actually viewed it as erotic.63 
 
55 Id. 
56 Id. 
57 See, e.g., Mathilde, Duchamp, Picabia, New York Dada and the Machine, WORLD OF 
ART (May 7, 2015), https://worldartworld.wordpress.com/2015/05/07/marcel-duchamps-
ready-mades/ [https://perma.cc/4K92-4E9X]. 
58 Josh Jones, The Iconic Urinal & Work of Art, “Fountain,” Wasn’t Created by Marcel 
Duchamp But by the Pioneering Dada Artist Elsa von Freytag-Loringhoven, OPEN 
CULTURE (July 5, 2018), http://www.openculture.com/2018/07/the-iconic-urinal-work-of-
art-fountain-wasnt-created-by-marcel-duchamp.html [https://perma.cc/HH2M-PVM2]. 
59 See Hustvedt, supra note 1. 
60 See William A. Camfield, Marcel Duchamp’s Fountain Its History and Aesthetics in 
the Context of 1917, 16 DADA/SURREALISM 64 (1987). 
61 Id. at 68. Paul B. Franklin, Object Choice: Marcel Duchamp’s Fountain and the Art 
of Queer Art History, in 23 OXFORD ART J. 1, 11–12 (2000). 
62 Id. Camfield, supra note 60, at 75–79. 
63 Camfield, supra note 60, at 75–79. The most important essay was penned by Louise 
Norton. Id. at 78–79. 
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Another notable appraisal confirms the erotic overtones of the 
urinal by making the trenchant point that The Fountain emerged 
from Duchamp amid public debates over the propriety of installing 
pissoirs (public toilets) in Paris.64 Many publicly voiced concerns 
that they were being used by gay men for liaisons.65 The selection 
of a urinal for display at a major art exhibition would certainly have 
been a criticism of such concerns.66 In a brief 1917 editorial in The 
Blind Man, the author argued that the urinal was both vulgar and 
plagiarism—asserting that it was merely an unoriginal piece of 
plumbing paraphernalia.67 Indeed, these were soundly rejected in 
language almost surely approved by Duchamp, one of the editors of 
the briefly extant journal.68 It read, in part humorously and entirely 
seriously, as follows: 
The Richard Mutt Case 
They say any artist paying six dollars may exhibit. 
 
Mr. Richard Mutt sent in a fountain. Without 
discussion this article disappeared and never was 
exhibited. 
 
What were the grounds for refusing Mr. Mutt’s 
fountain; 
 
1. Some contended that it was immoral, vulgar. 
 
2. Others It was plagiarism, a plain piece of pluming. 
 
Now Mr. Mutt’s fountain is not immoral, that is 
absurd, no more than a bath tub is immoral. It is  
 
64 Franklin, supra note 61, at 25. 
65 Id. at 25. 
66 Id. at 31–34. 
67 See THE BLIND MAN NO. 2 (May 1917), https://www.toutfait.com/issues/ 
issue_3/Collections/girst/Blindman2/5.html [https://perma.cc/EDX6-MA3J]. Only two 
editions of The Blind Man were published. They appeared in 1917 and were edited by 
Marcel Duchamp, Beatrice Wood, and Henri-Pierre Roché. Nick Bennett, The Blind Man, 
THE BROOKLYN RAIL (June 2018), https://brooklynrail.org/2018/06/art_books/The-Blind-
Man [https://perma.cc/H8SL-N76X]. 
68 Id. 
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a fixture that you see every day in plumbers’  
show windows. 
 
Whether Mr. Mutt with his own hands made the 
fountain or not has no importance. He CHOSE it.  
He took an ordinary article of life, placed it so that 
its useful significance disappeared under the new 
title and point of view—created a new thought for 
that object. 
 
As for plumbing, that is absurd. The only works of 
art America has given are her plumbing and her 
bridges.69 
Given this variety of interesting analytical structures for 
Fountain, it becomes virtually impossible to claim that the work 
lacked originality. It also becomes impossible to deny that it is a 
pictorial, graphic, or sculptural work within the meaning of the 
Copyright Act—that a “useful article . . . shall be considered a 
pictorial, graphic, or sculptural work only if, and only to the extent 
that, such design incorporates pictorial, graphic, or sculptural 
features that can be identified separately from, and are capable of 
existing independently of, the utilitarian aspects of the article.”70 
While a urinal hanging on the wall in a men’s room or await- 
ing sale in a plumbing supply store is certainly neither origi- 
nal nor a sculptural work, its character changes when it is placed  
back side down on a pedestal for purposes of display in a setting 
communicating a variety of artistic, cultural, moral, and humor- 
ous perspectives.71 
 As Justice Thomas noted in the recent case of Star Athletica, 
LLC v. Varsity Brands, Inc., the statute requires the fulfillment of a 
two-part test in order to be a sculpture rather than a utilitarian object. 
72 The first prong requires that a viewer “be able to look at the useful 
article and spot some two- or three-dimensional element that 
 
69 Camfield, supra note 60, at 76. 
70 17 U.S.C. § 101. 
71 See Camfield, supra note 60, at 75–79. 
72 Star Athletica, LLC v. Varsity Brands, Inc., 137  S. Ct. 1002, 1010 (2017). 
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appears to have pictorial, graphic, or sculptural qualities.”73 Given 
the wide array of perspectives about the possible meaning of The 
Fountain, it is difficult to deny that the placement of a urinal in the 
“wrong” position in an artistic environment changes its potential 
utility into something quite different. Justice Thomas goes on the 
opine that the sculptural “feature must be able to exist as its own 
pictorial, graphic, or sculptural work . . . once it is imagined apart 
from the useful article.”74
 
The same imagination that allows a viewer 
to “spot” a sculptural element in the urinal explains why it can be 
seen as something separate and apart from the urinal as a functional 
item.75 Other famous Duchamp works—Bicycle Wheel and In 
Advance of a Broken Arm—fulfill the separability requirements for 
similar reasons, since Duchamp’s intention in all of these works  
was to remove them from their “ready-made,” typically utilitarian 
appearance, and display them in a setting that established them  
as artistic works.76 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                       Bicycle Wheel                                  In Advance of the Broken Arm 
 
73 Id. 
74 Id. 
75 Id. 
76 The original of this work has been lost, but the replicas pictured here are in the 
collection of the Museum of Modern Art. See Marcel Duchamp, Bicycle Wheel, in MUSEUM 
OF MOD. ART, https://www.moma.org/learn/moma_learning/marcel-duchamp-bicycle-
wheel-new-york-1951-third-version-after-lost-original-of-1913/ [https://perma.cc/5YVE-
RTAZ]; see also Broken Arm, supra note 22. The Broken Arm piece is typically displayed 
hanging from a wire attached to the ceiling so it can rotate with the ambient breezes in the 
gallery. 
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       Similar conclusions about originality and artistic qualities ap-
ply to Cattelan taping a banana to a wall in The Comedian. Perhaps, 
unlike Duchamp, the banana used in that work was not the first 
instance in which certain ideas were brought to life. Decaying 
materials were used in other art works, though Cattelan’s may have 
been the first to use a banana.77 The intentions—pranksterism, 
commentary on decay, and critique of extant art movements—were 
not new.78 Note that Duchamp’s motivations traveled in similar 
arenas: the idea of using decay as a statement about temporality, the 
rottenness of contemporary artistic practice, and life and death can 
be made evident in an infinite number of ways.79 And, of course, 
ideas are not copyrightable; only the expression of ideas is 
protected.80 Cattelan simply selected a banana as his expressive 
mode. And, like Fountain, the intention was made palpable by 
imposing his will upon a tangible object, largely by altering its 
location and presentation.81 
The artist’s gallerist—Emanuel Perrotin82—claimed that every 
aspect of Comedian was “carefully considered from the shape of the 
fruit, to the angle it has been affixed with duct tape to the wall, to its 
placement in the booth—front and center, on a large wall that could 
 
77 There is a lengthy tradition of allowing works to rot or decay. Like Cattelan and many 
others, Edvard Munch was known for using decaying materials in his work as part of a 
commentary on life, death, decay, and temporality. See DAVID A. SCOTT, ART: 
AUTHENTICITY, RESTORATION, FORGERY 397 (2016). Or explore Urs Fischer’s candle 
sculptures—large wax compositions mimicking famous works that he lights and allows to 
melt into puddles over time. See Alice Yoo, Urs Fischer’s Dramatically Melting 
Sculptures, MY MODERN MET (May 1, 2012), https://mymodernmet.com/urs-fischer-
melting-sculptures/ [https://perma.cc/Q5FZ-VKTJ]. 
78 Perhaps the namesake for much of this was not Duchamp, but Francis Picabia, who 
steadfastly made work undercutting extant artistic movements. See Sam Ben-Meir, Francis 
Picabia: A Painter for This Moment, GLOB. RSCH. (Feb. 24, 2017), 
https://www.globalresearch.ca/francis-picabia-a-painter-for-this-moment/5576545 
[https://perma.cc/YSH6-3ZJG].  
79 See supra note 77. 
80 17 U.S.C. § 102(b). 
81 See Star Athletica, LLC v. Varsity Brands, Inc., 137 S. Ct. 1002, 1010. Though not 
discussed here, it also may be true that the combination of a banana with duct tape and a 
wall may itself be an original composition. Perhaps the work’s originality arises not just 
because Cattelan used a banana, but also tape and a wall. 
82 See PERROTIN, https://www.perrotin.com/about [https://perma.cc/8J8H-F29W]. 
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have easily fit a much larger painting.”83 That statement is 
confirmed in the Certificate of Authenticity and Installation 
Instructions that are transferred to a buyer when an instance of The 
Comedian is sold to a purchaser, allowing the installation of the 
work at another location.84 The document contains very precise 
instructions on how to effect an installation.85 The Comedian story 
is relatively similar to that of the Oscar Wilde photograph labeled as 
original in the famous case Burrow-Giles Lithographic Company v. 
Sarony.86 According to Justice Miller, the staging of the pose and 
background was more than enough to make the photograph 
original.87 In addition, it is worth repeating that originality need not 
be novel. Just a minimal imposition of human will upon an object 
will suffice.88 In these cases, the imposition of will does not need to 
be directly on the appearance of the object itself, but on its 
placement and in the perceptions its placement generates.89 
Therefore, The Comedian qualifies. 
 
83 Sarah Cascone, Maurizio Cattelan is Taping Bananas to a Wall at Art Basel Miami 
Beach and Selling Them for $120,000 Each, ARTNET (Dec. 4, 2019), 
https://news.artnet.com/market/maurizio-cattelan-banana-art-basel-miami-beach-1722516 
[https://perma.cc/7XFG-E8EA]; see also Jordan Hoffman, ‘It is Something Deeper’: David 
Datuna on Why He Ate the $120,000 Banana, THE GUARDIAN (Dec. 11, 2019), 
https://www.theguardian.com/artanddesign/2019/dec/11/david-datuna-120000-banana-
interview-art-basel-miami [https://perma.cc/RRV8-PEPQ].    
84 See Cascone, supra note 83. Much contemporary art involves a plan for installation 
of a work rather than an actual, tangible object. Sol LeWitt is famous for such work. When 
such art is sold, the artist conveys a certificate of authenticity to the buyer allowing 
installation of the work. For a thorough analysis of the copyright consequences of this 
practice, see Richard Chused, “Temporary” Conceptual Art: Property and Copyright, 
Hopes and Prayers, 45 RUTGERS COMPUT. & TECH. L.J. 1, 2 (2019) [hereinafter Chused, 
“Temporary” Conceptual Art]. 
85 Katherine Wisniewski at the gallery was kind enough to sendthe author an unsigned 
copy of the Certificate and Instructions. It contains very detailed images with precise 
measurements about the placement and taping of the banana on the wall. E-mailfrom 
Katherine Wisniewski, Assoc. Dir. Of Commc’n and Mktg., Perrotin, to author (Feb. 20, 
2020, 3:31 EST) (on file with author) [hereinafter E-mail from Katherine Wisniewski]. 
86 111 U.S. 53, 60 (1884). 
87 Id. at 60. 
88 See Alfred Bell & Co. v. Catalda Fine Arts, 191 F.2d 99, 102–03 (2d Cir. 1951) 
(citations omitted). See discussion of Feist Publ’ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co. and Alfred 
Bell v. Catalda, supra notes 34–36. 
89 See Star Athletica, LLC v. Varsity Brands, Inc., 137 S. Ct. 1002, 1010 (2017); 
Burrow-Giles, 111 U.S. at 53. 
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The spectacles on the museum floor were original. Kevin 
Nguyen and TJ Khayatan—the two young men who created the 
spectacle of spectacles—were quoted by The New York Times as 
performing their glasses routine because of the weak quality of what 
was on display at the San Francisco Museum of Modern Art: 
“Is this really what you call art?” Kevin said in an 
interview over the weekend. 
 
TJ added, “We looked at it and we were like, ‘This is 
pretty easy. We could make this ourselves.’”90 
Their intent was quite similar to that of Duchamp or Cattelan. 
They asked highly aesthetic questions about the nature of artistic 
endeavors, challenged expectations about what sorts of objects 
should be in museums, and wondered with great anticipation what 
human reactions would become visible. 
In short, Nguyen and Khayatan became artists in a flash. Good 
for them! They thought the art they viewed in the museum was 
simple minded and pointless.91 Their reaction was to spontaneous-
ly mimic the silliness they saw.92 Essentially, they made a parody—
a much more serious form of creativity than mere pranksterism.  
It worked like a charm. Museum visitors reacted as if the museum 
environment had been altered in a new and provocative way.93  
In short, it hardly was an event without originality—spontaneous 
but nonetheless new, instinctive but nonetheless astute, prankish  
but nonetheless artistically challenging, funny but nonetheless mad-
deningly successful. 
II. FIXATION: BANANAS 
The Copyright Act provides that a work is fixed when “its 
embodiment in a copy or phonorecord, by or under the authority of 
the author, is sufficiently permanent or stable to permit it to be 
perceived, reproduced, or otherwise communicated for a period of 
 
90 See Mele, supra note 7. 
91 Id. 
92 Id. 
93 See id. 
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more than transitory duration.”94 This requirement raises two sets of 
questions about Cattelan’s The Comedian. First, Emanuel Perrotin, 
Cattelan’s gallerist, claimed that the actual “work” was not really 
the banana, but the certificate of authenticity confirming that a 
purchaser had the right to install the work by following the 
instructions in the certificate on how to do the wall taping.95 What 
does that mean for purposes of fixation and perhaps originality? The 
second poses issues closely related in some ways to originality. 
Though the Copyright Act does not explicitly require that the artist 
or the artist’s agent actually cause the fixation, it certainly may be 
read as requiring that such a step be taken.96 Merely taking a 
preexisting object and moving it around, one might think, will not 
satisfy the standard. In addition, the banana was in a constant 
process of change and decay. Does that mean the piece may never 
be fixed? Similarly, what “fixes” The Fountain? And what is it that 
was fixed? 
A. Certificates of Authenticity and Fixation 
As noted, David Datuna un-taped and ate one of Maurizio 
Cattelan’s bananas.97 Even Perrotin, Cattelan’s gallerist, took one of 
the bananas off the wall and ate it!98 He reportedly said, “Maurizio, 
it’s a good banana, I have to say.”99 He went on to claim that in the 
absence of a certificate of authenticity, anyone removing a banana 
without paying the price owns nothing except a banana digesting in 
a belly.100 Sarah Cascone described Perrotin’s explanation of how 
this particular composition worked as conceptual art:” In a way, 
explained Perrotin, securing a buyer for the piece completed the 
artwork. ‘A work like that,’ he said, ‘if you don’t sell the work, it’s 
 
94 17 U.S.C. § 101. 
95 Cascone, supra note 84. 
96 17 U.S.C. § 102. 
97 See Pogrebin, supra note 2. 
98 See Rob Picheta, Someone Ate a $120,000 Banana that an Artist Had Taped to a Wall, 
CNN (Dec. 9, 2019), https://www.cnn.com/style/article/banana-artwork-eaten-scli-
intl/index.html [https://perma.cc/2F8S-QM5H].  
99 Id. 
100 See Cascone, supra note 83. 
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not a work of art.’”101 Perrotin’s explanation of the work was more 
fully explained by Robin Pogrebin: 
According to the gallery, Mr. Datuna’s stunt did not 
actually destroy the artwork or whatever monetary 
value it might have had at that moment. The three 
buyers who collectively spent about $390,000 on the 
taped fruit had bought the concept of the piece, which 
comes with a certificate of authenticity from the 
artist, along with installation instructions. It is up to 
the owners to secure their own materials from 
hardware and grocery stores, and to replace the 
banana, if they wish, whenever it rots. After Mr. 
Datuna consumed the banana, the gallery taped 
another one to the wall.102 
The surface implication of this statement is that the actual 
banana taped to the wall at Miami Basel was not an artwork at all; it 
was just a banana and some tape on a wall. The actual work was the 
certificate of authenticity and its accompanying instruction set.103 
That is difficult to accept. Art comes and goes with great regularity. 
Many works are intended to be temporary. Eliasson’s Waterfalls, for 
example, were intended by all concerned to be temporary; and they 
were taken down after a time.104 The fixation requirement certainly 
does not require absolute permanence. 
 
101 Id. 
102 See Pogrebin, supra note 2. 
103 This sort of arrangement with a certificate and instructions is a typical arrangement 
for many pieces of conceptual art. See, e.g., Chused, “Temporary” Conceptual Art, supra 
note 84, at 10–12. For an analysis of some of the consequences of this practice for works 
by Sol LeWitt, see id. at 1. 
104 Olafur Eliasson, The New York City Waterfalls, in PUB. ART FUND, 
https://www.publicartfund.org/exhibitions/view/the-new-york-city-waterfalls/ 
[https://perma.cc/48CB-AHHQ]. Another well-known example was a striking installation 
in Central Park—The Gates—by Cristo. It was constructed during the winter of 2005 and 
remained up only for two weeks in February. The Gates, in CHRISTO AND JEAN-CLAUDE, 
http://christojeanneclaude.net/projects/the-gates [https://perma.cc/BDS7-K5ZC]. 7,503 
orange draped gates were built over paths throughout the park. Id. The barren winter trees 
allowed park strollers to see the bright orange gates far into the distance as paths ascended 
and descended upon hillsides. The experience of walking through The Gates was 
breathtaking. 
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Many works by artists such as Sol LeWitt, Donald Judd, Dan 
Flavin, and others are sold the same way.105 Cattelan transferred 
three copies of The Comedian at Miami Basel.106 In each case, 
purchase of a certificate and an instruction set was the sine qua non 
of ownership, allowing the work to be installed and uninstalled in 
the preferred time frame of the owner.107 In most of these cases, the 
artists presumably retained a copyright in the certificate and 
instructions. And the documents usually contained a drawing of the 
work and/or expressed how to complete the installation.108 This 
means the creator of the idea and composition described in the 
certificate and instruction document, itself copyrighted, or the 
creator’s successor in interest, must also be consulted before an 
installation is approved. In short, the certificate and instruction set 
typically only gives authority to pursue permission to install, not 
actually to do it unilaterally.109 
In reality, the ownership structure may be complex after the 
transfer of a conceptual artwork like The Comedian. Each of the 
three purchasers obtained a non-intellectual property right—a 
typical tangible property right—in the certificate and instruction 
document.110 But a copyright was retained by the artist in those same 
documents since they were expressive, original, and fixed.111 When 
the work is installed, it becomes a derivative work of the original 
expression in the certificate and instructions.112 The Act defines such 
a work as one: 
 
105 See Chused, “Temporary” Conceptual Art, supra note 84, at 2–4; Graham Bowley, 
It’s a Banana, It’s Art. And Now It’s the Guggenheim’s Problem., N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 18, 
2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/09/18/arts/design/banana-art-guggenheim.html 
[https://perma.cc/8H4H-NNYF]. 
106 See Pogrebin, supra note 2. 
107 See id. 
108 There is no formal copyright notice on the certificate of authenticity and instructions 
for The Comedian, but it does contain a series of detailed color diagrams of a property 
installation and clearly meets both the originality and fixation requirements. See E-mail 
from Katherine Wisniewski, supra note 85. Cattelan surely holds a copyright in the 
document.  
109 See Chused, “Temporary” Conceptual Art, supra note 84, at 2. 
110 See 17 U.S.C. § 202; Pogrebin, supra note 2. 
111 17 U.S.C. §102. 
112 17 U.S.C. §101. 
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[B]ased upon one or more preexisting works, such  
as a translation, musical arrangement, dramatiza-
tion, fictionalization, motion picture version, sound 
recording, art reproduction, abridgment, condensa-
tion, or any other form in which a work may be 
recast, transformed, or adapted. A work consisting  
of editorial revisions, annotations, elaborations, or 
other modifications which, as a whole, represent  
an original work of authorship, is a “derivative 
work.”113 
For purposes of this Article, it is critically important to recognize 
that an installation is a recasting or an adaptation of the original 
work as expressed in the certificate of authenticity and instructions. 
Note that installing a derivative work requires permission of the 
original creator.114 The original author must be consulted because 
all derivative works reuse part or all of the original work. In 
addition, the derivative work only gains protection for the new 
material it adds to the original; it does not diminish or alter the force 
of the original copyright.115 That perfectly describes an installed 
conceptual artwork like The Comedian. 
But things may quickly become complicated once we get past 
the clear-cut part of the copyright structure. The intellectual property 
rights in a physical, derivative manifestation of the work could be 
held by a variety of different people, either individually or jointly, 
depending upon who installed the work.116 The artist may hold the 
copyright in the derivative work, as well as that in the certificate of 
authenticity, if the artist participated in fabricating and installing 
it.117 The installers may instead own that interest if the artist did not 
directly supervise their work.118 Or perhaps the person owning the 
certificate and instruction document, if given free reign by the artist 
 
113 Id. 
114 Matt Knight, Using Another Author’s Work—Is Your Derivative Work Infringing 
Someone’s Copyright?, SIDEBAR SATURDAYS (Aug. 10, 2019), https://www.sidebar 
saturdays.com/2019/08/10/derivative-works/ [https://perma.cc/7MNK-WWFK]. 
115 17 U.S.C. §103(b). 
116 See 17 U.S.C. § 103; Knight, supra note 114. 
117 See Knight, supra note 114. 
118 Id. 
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or the artist’s successor to proceed with the installation, may be the 
author of the derivative work.119 In short, ownership can quickly 
become multi-faceted. None of this undermines the validity of the 
copyright held by the artist in the certificate and instructions or the 
recognition that a particular installation may carry its own copyright 
as a derivative work. 
Therefore, if a work is expressive and contains enough changes 
from the instructions to be original, copyrights will almost always 
exist in both the certificate and instructions as well as in an installed 
version of the work.120 Consequently, Perrotin’s statement that the 
work was not art until its purchase was misleading, if not simply 
wrong. For copyright purposes, the certificate and instruction 
documents almost always satisfy the originality, expression, and 
fixation requirements. The installed manifestations of those 
documents also meet those requirements. They are “recast, 
transformed, or adapted”121 from the documents, and they too are 
original and expressive. Many of these works manifest themselves 
differently from installation to installation, depending on the setting 
in which they are mounted. Sol LeWitt’s wall drawings, for 
example, vary in appearance depending on the size of the walls 
used.122 And in Cattelan’s case, mere change of the room 
environment will force decisions to be made about exactly where to 
tape the banana to the wall, about which to banana to use, about the 
length of the pieces of tape to use given the size of the fruit,123 and 
perhaps the color to paint the wall. An installation is not an 
automatic or routinely composed work.124 This analysis also means 
 
119 Id. 
120 See 17 U.S.C. §103. 
121 17 U.S.C. § 101. 
122 See Chused, “Temporary” Conceptual Art, supra note 84, at 22. 
123 The instructions provide “about” 20 centimeters when measuring the first piece of 
tape. E-mail from Katherine Wisniewski, supra note 85. If a very large banana is used, a 
slightly longer piece could presumably be used. Similarly, the wall color is not prescribed, 
though the height from the floor and angle of the tape is expressed using “about” again. Id. 
The angle of the banana, of course, is impossible to precisely measure. And the instructions 
suggest that the fruit be changed every seven to ten days. Id. These directions leave enough 
room for an installer to make independent judgments about the work each time it is placed 
on a wall, allowing an original derivative copyright to exist. 
124 For a much lengthier analysis of the copyright issues involved in installing a work of 
conceptual art, see Chused, “Temporary” Conceptual Art, supra note 84. 
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that the important fixation questions in The Comedian are not about 
the certificate and instruction documents. They clearly are fixed in 
a tangible means of expression. But, as elucidated in the next 
section, there still may be questions about whether installed, visible, 
and derivative versions of the work are fixed, even if we assume 
they are original and expressive. 
B. Object Relocation and Decay 
As with originality, the only aspect of installed banana-style 
works that may be fixed is the movement of objects into a place  
of public display. But why should that not qualify as fixation, at  
least some of the time? The standard should be that if the move- 
ment of a preexisting, fixed object to a new place was original,  
then fixation has occurred. The underlying explanation is fairly 
simple. Certainly, placing everyday objects into large compositions 
satisfies the requirement. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Robert Rauschenberg, Canyon (1959) 
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Consider Robert Rauschenberg’s influential compositions—
combining painting, collage, and assemblage.125 His important  
and markedly creative 1959 work Canyon is both a prime and 
historically important example.126 
 Though the stuffed eagle in Canyon had no particularly artistic 
value when on a shelf in a taxidermy shop, it took on compelling 
artistic force when it was incorporated into a large combine. 
Rauschenberg’s intent was to create a three-dimensional compo-
sition.127 Its placement in the larger work was aesthetic in intent.  
The bird became part of a fixed work. While some may think that 
the eagle itself is not fixed for copyright purposes,128 it obtained that 
status by Rauschenberg’s placement of the object into a large 
composition. As with artistic intention, relocation of an everyday 
object often will bestow both originality and fixation upon it. 
Though the placements of Duchamp’s urinal and Cattelan’s 
banana in new locations were not part of larger compositional works 
like Rauschenberg’s combines, the artists’ intentions were similarly 
aesthetic. Moreover, the placements were entirely original. It would 
be odd if the placement of a preexisting object in a combine is 
statutorily construed as fixed while its placement in a novel gallery 
setting is not. In both cases, new compositions were created. In the 
single object placement cases, the gallery locations create drama-
tically new environments for the works. The process is quite similar 
to the composition of Rothko’s Chapel at the Menil Collection, 
Monet’s Water Lilies at the Musée de l’Orangerie, or Nevelson’s 
constructions. It was the placement of each individual painting or 
sculptural element, not just their individual, tangible status, that was 
part of their copyright fixation. 
 
125 Robert Rauschenberg, Combines, CENTRE POMIDOU (1953), http://mediation.centre 
pompidou.fr/education/ressources/ENS-Rauschenberg-EN/ENS-rauschenberg-EN.htm 
[https://perma.cc/2EHJ-NYWZ].  
126 The text image is on the site of the Museum of Modern Art. Robert Rauschenberg, 
MUSEUM OF MOD. ART (1959), https://www.moma.org/collection/works/165011 
[https://perma.cc/6425-FDKZ]. 
127 It may, for example, not be original. The eagle preexisted its stuffing and preservation. 
Nothing about the object itself was particularly new or creative. 
128 Given the author’s position about fixation of The Fountain, however, the author 
believes the eagle could be fixed if it is used by itself for artistic purposes. 
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This idea also applies to both The Fountain and the spectacles 
on the floor of the San Francisco Museum of Modern Art. Once 
intentionally placed in an aesthetically interesting location, the spec-
tacles became fixed as copyrightable sculptural works. And the new-
ly located objects need not be in their places of fixation for very 
long. The requirement that a work be fixed for “a period of more 
than transitory duration” imposes a very short-term limitation.129  
If presence of software in a computer’s volatile memory is a fixed 
copy of a protected work,130 then certainly the urinal and spectacles 
fulfill that element of the fixation requirement. 
A more challenging issue is raised when objects used in a work 
either constantly change while on display or change in one dramatic 
moment. Such projects were and are part of a large cultural set of 
artistic endeavors exploring the relationships between stability and 
instability, life and death, and permanence and impermanence. 
Instability was, of course, a major copyright problem with The 
Comedian. A banana, whether on a tree ripening, in a bowl waiting 
to be eaten, or on a wall decaying, constantly changes. Cattelan’s 
work, in a biological sense, was never totally stable. 
The definition of fixation creates significant ambiguity in 
settings involving changing works. The Copyright Act defines a 
fixed work as one that is “sufficiently permanent or stable to permit 
it to be perceived, reproduced, or otherwise communicated for a 
period of more than transitory duration.”131 This definition assumes 
the possibility that some art objects will change over time. They  
are only required to be “sufficiently permanent or stable,” not just 
 
129 17 U.S.C. § 101. As noted at the outset of this Article, the original version of The 
Fountain disappeared shortly after it was photographed by Alfred Stieglitz. Though it 
existed for only a short time, that certainly met the duration requirement. See Marcek 
Duchamp and the Fountain Scandal, PHILA. MUSEUM OF ART (Mar. 27, 2017), 
https://press.philamuseum.org/marcel.org/marcel-duchamp-and-the-fountain-scandal/ 
[https://perma.cc/7A7V-4RYV].  
130 See MAI Sys. Corp. v. Peak Computer, Inc., 991 F.2d 511, 519 (9th Cir. 1993) 
(involving the protection of a computer program when it is moved from a storage device 
into memory, which empties out when the program is shut down or the computer is turned 
off). 
131 17 U.S.C. § 101. 
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permanent or stable, to be perceptible or communicated.132 Pure 
permanence is not part of the definition. The underlying problem 
concerns the potential meaning of this standard in different varieties 
of change situations— ones where alteration occurs so slowly that 
people do not perceive the change or where transformations are 
continuously obvious to the human eye. Discussion of four exam-
ples will facilitate working through the problems of fixation and 
instability—the use of evanescent paints in many well-known  
art works,133 Urs Fischer’s burning candle sculptures,134 Olafur 
Eliasson’s 2008 installation of Waterfalls on the East River in New 
York City,135 and Banksy’s shredding of Girl with Balloon at 
Sotheby’s in London in 2018.136 In each of these situations there was 
ongoing or sudden alteration in the nature of an artistic composition. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                      Vincent Van Gogh, Roses (1890) 
 
132 Id.; see also Dawn Leung, A Fixation on Moral Rights: The Implications of Kelley v. 
Chicago Park District for Copyright and VARA Protection, 4 ARIZ. ST. SPORTS & ENT. L.J. 
1, 22 (2014). 
133 See Sophie Haigney, ‘The Scream’ is Fading. New Research Reveals Why., N.Y. 
TIMES (Feb. 7, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/02/07/arts/design/the-scream-
edvard-munch-science.html [https://perma.cc/UU5V-GYYW]; see infra pp. 198-99. 
134 See Yoo, supra note 77. 
135 See The New York City Waterfalls, supra note 104. See infra pp. 202-03. 
136 See Greg Kumparak, Banksy Piece Immediately Shreds Itself After Being Sold for 
$1.1M, TECHCRUNCH (Oct. 6, 2018, 1:48PM), https://techcrunch.com/2018/10/06/banksy-
piece-immediately-shreds-itself-after-being-sold-for-1-25m/ [https://perma.cc/38ES-
EV78]; see infra pp. 208-10. 
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 Much of the problem dissolves when considered as a matter of 
day to day reality. All things on earth change constantly, some 
quickly and some quite slowly. All art works, even the most iconic 
paintings, are in a constant process of decay. Conservation efforts 
may return a composition to its original appearance in large part, but 
the original work is never fully restored.137 Among the most noted 
examples are some of the works of Vincent Van Gogh—especially 
his pink rose compositions.138 He often used a blush pink pigment—
red lake—that is notorious for its highly fugitive hue.139 The blooms 
in the 1890 painting entitled Roses, pictured above, held by the 
Metropolitan Museum of Art.140, originally were brightly colored. 
It would be shocking if Van Gogh’s works were recently created 
and then denied copyright protection because of anticipation that the 
paint pigments would degrade, especially when exposed to light. 
Natural, slow moving changes are inherent in all works of art, indeed 
of all things on earth. The legal status of the objects should not be 
altered when an artist makes this natural process an overt element of 
an artistic work rather than a “hidden” progression buried in the 
nature of the materials used. 
The issues are a bit more difficult when the processes of change 
or decay are so obvious, continuous, or intentional that virtually 
anyone can perceive that something is happening. That may be true 
of The Comedian, though decay of the banana is not actually 
 
137 There are a number of other very well-known painters whose works have similar 
problems. For a recent survey of these painters, see Haigney, supra note 133.  
138 Id. In addition to work by Munch, Haigney also mentions Van Gogh’s The 
Bedroom (1889), in which purples have faded to blues, and other artists like Matisse. 
Id. 
139 See Sarah Everts, Van Gogh’s Fading Colors Inspire Scientific Inquiry, CHEM. & 
ENG’G NEWS (Feb. 1, 2016), https://cen.acs.org/articles/94/i5/Van-Goghs-Fading-Colors-
Inspire.html [https://perma.cc/2G5E-RCCE]. Id. 
140 This public domain image is available online. . See Roses by Vincent Van Gogh, 
available at METRO. MUSEUM OF ART, https://www.metmuseum.org/art/collection 
/search/436534https://www.metmuseum.org/art/collection/search/436534 [https://perma 
.cc/PW6P-9BE4]. Museum investigations discovered traces of the original color at various 
locations on the canvas. For more information on Van Gogh’s color longevity issues, see 
Nina Siegal, Van Gogh’s True Palette Revealed, N.Y. TIMES, ( Apr. 29, 2013), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2013/04/30/arts/30iht-vangogh30.html [https://perma.cc/FUF9-
FVQR]. 
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perceived moment to moment. It enters our thought processes 
because of what we know about bananas. A recent example that is 
quite similar to The Comedian is a work by Darren Bader consisting 
of forty pieces of vegetables and fruit that was exhibited this year at 
the Whitney Museum in New York.141 As shown in the image below, 
they were placed on pedestals like Duchamp’s Fountain. The food 
items were “sourced and refreshed from a weekly Fresh Direct 
delivery and regular trips to a nearby Chelsea fruit market.”142 In 
fact, the decay of fruit on public display is not dramatically different 
from the loss of vibrancy in Van Gogh’s pigments. The change just 
occurs somewhat more rapidly.143 
 
Darren Bader, Fruits, Vegetables; Fruit and Vegetable Salad as displayed  
at the Whitney Museum in 2020.144 
 
141 See Darren Bader, Fruits, Vegetables; Fruit and Vegetable Salad, WHITNEY MUSEUM 
OF AM. ART, https://whitney.org/exhibitions/fruits-vegetables [https://perma.cc/8VQ4-
CQD2]. 
142 See Bowley, supra note 105; see also id. 
143 Museums owning certificates and instructions for conceptual art or installed versions 
of such works that decay over time have particularly challenging conservation issues. For 
example, an instance of Cattelan’s The Comedian is owned by the Guggenheim Museum 
in New York. Id. Other museums own works consisting of fluorescent tubes installed in 
accordance with instructions created by Dan Flavin. Id. What is appropriate conservation 
action when one of the tubes starts to flicker? For discussion of these and a number of other 
examples, see id. 
144    See Bader, supra note 141. 
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 Urs Fischer’s candle sculptures provide another example. They 
are among the most notable and pertinent artistic compositions 
exhibiting change. Fischer duplicates famous old sculptures or 
constructs more modern human figures in large wax forms and 
places wicks through them extending from the tops so they can be 
lit.145 After being displayed as obviously fixed wax works, the large 
candles are lit. The works then degrade into puddles and chunks of 
fallen wax.146 The process may take a significant period of time. The 
“candles” typically are quite large. Here, rather than raising issues 
of natural decay or rot over time, Fischer makes the process overt. 
Certainly, an audio-visual work of the melting process would be 
protected. But what about a particular moment when the melting 
piece is seen by a gallery visitor? 
Thought of as a process, the burning candle is no different from 
Van Gogh’s red lake paint degrading or Cattelan’s banana rotting. 
Thinking of it as an intellectual process, however, does create a 
difference. The artistic intentions of Van Gogh and Fischer were 
hardly the same. However, both artists intended to embody a 
creative work in a form that was easily perceived as both aesthetic 
and stable at the moment of viewing. The presence of burning wicks 
may change our imagination as we view a Fischer piece, but at the 
moment of observation, the candles typically appear just as stable as 
a painting. While we know candles melt, we don’t typically perceive 
the decay process at most moments or in short viewing intervals 
 
145 See Pinar Noorata, Classic Sculpture Replica Is a Giant Melting Candle, MY MOD 
MET (July 2, 2012), https://mymodernmet.com/urs-fischer-the-rape-of-the-sabine-women-
untitled [https://perma.cc/M3V3-DJPK]; see also Yoo, supra note 77. 
146 See Yoo, supra note 77. Yoo’s article contains pictures of one of his most famous 
wax-candle works mimicking Giambologna’s 16th-century sculpture The Rape of the 
Sabine Women at various stages of its melting away. Id. It melted at the Venice Biennale 
in 2011. Id. The Whitney Museum had another of his works melt, which depicted a man 
facing a mirror so “he” could “watch” himself melt! See Jerry Saltz, This 8-Foot Candle 
Portrait Mesmerized Me, VULTURE (May 17, 2016), http://www.vulture.com/2016/05/urs-
fischer-julian-schnabel-wax-sculpture.html [https://perma.cc/TT5B-YEJ2]. 
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even when the wicks are visibly lit.147 And only a short period of 
time is necessary to fulfill the statutory fixation definition.148 
The issues get more difficult with works that overtly embody 
constant and continuous change in ways we cannot help but 
perceive. Olafur Eliasson’s Waterfalls and Banksy’s shredding 
caper are good illustrations. For both, alterations in appearance were 
obvious to all viewers. With a grant from the Public Art Fund in 
New York City, Eliasson arranged for the construction of four large 
scaffolds from 90 to 120 feet tall in the East River between Brooklyn 
and Governors Island south of Manhattan.149 A system was built on 
each scaffold that pumped water up to the top where it cascaded 
back down into the river.150 Special Circle Line tour boats ran 
frequent trips allowing close up visits to each of the four artificial 
waterfalls.151 The most notable of the four, located under the 
Brooklyn Bridge, is displayed below.152 The falls were lit up, 
making night visits especially stunning. As with Fischer’s work, 
here too an audio-visual recording of one of the waterfalls in 
operation was copyrightable, but short of that do other sorts of 
intellectual property rights attach? Obviously, the installation was 
never stable moment to moment when operating. And the change 
was neither natural, as with a Van Gogh painting, nor extremely 
slow as in a Fischer “candle.” We perceive the water’s rapid, 
downward movement constantly. Does that mean it was not fixed 
unless the supporting scaffold and water systems were original 
sculptural works? Finding fixation, at least while the waterfalls were 
in operation, seems problematic, at least initially. 
 
147 There, of course, may be moments when the burning process leads to chunks of the 
candle falling to the ground. Stability obviously is lost at such times, but it is quickly 
restored once the moment passes. 
148 See 17 U.S.C. § 101. It cannot be a performance without a fixation. Someone would 
have to make an audio-visual fixation of the candle decay for a performance to become 
copyrightable. 
149 The New York City Waterfalls, supra note 104. 
150 Id. 
151 Conrad Mulcahy, Guide to Viewing the Waterfalls, N.Y. TIMES (June 27, 2008), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2008/06/27/arts/design/27bwate.html [https://perma.cc/5P3X-
N2RR]. 
152 The author shot this image while having dinner at the South Street Seaport on the 
Manhattan side of the East River just south of the Brooklyn Bridge. 
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The Waterfalls was similar to Mud Muse—another Robert 
Rauschenberg work that was reconstructed in 2017 for a large 
retrospective exhibition of his work at the Museum of Modern Art 
in New York.153 Mud Muse, originally on display from 1968 to 
1971,154 was a large vat filled with 8,000 pounds of mud that 
constantly bubbled in response to the sounds of whatever music was 
being played at the time.155 As with the structures behind Eliasson’s 
waterfalls, the vat, mud, mechanical, and electronic equipment were 
clearly fixed. They might even be deemed an artwork, at least in 
part. A vat of mud plays a similar role as Eliasson’s structures. But 
when turned on, the mud was in constant motion and the sounds of 
 
153 See Robert Rauschenberg: Among Friends, MUSEUM OF MOD. ART, 
https://www.moma.org/audio/playlist/40/655 [https://perma.cc/2H2F-ZGT4]. 
154 Id. 
155 Id. The author recorded a brief video of the installation while visiting the 
retrospective. The image in the text is a still from the video. When experiencing the work, 
the sounds, aroma, and bubbles were mesmerizing. See also Julia Halperin, 
Rauschenberg’s Musical Machine: The Story Behind the 8,000 Pounds of Mud Inside 
MoMA, ARTNET NEWS (May 12, 2017), https://news.artnet.com/art-world/robert-
rauschenberg-mud-moma-958310 [https://perma.cc/DXE4-EQQA]. 
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bubbles popping and mud plopping back into the vat were quite 
audible. Those characteristics are visually discernible even in a 
single image like the one below. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
So, what would happen if another person replicated the work of 
either Eliasson or Rauschenberg? Would that be infringing? Is 
constant perceptible motion or change ever fixed? If the overall form 
is clear, the realm of motion is limited in its spatial realm, and the 
range of motion is clearly perceptible in its general appearance, why 
should that be treated differently from Van Gogh’s decaying paint, 
Fischer’s slow candle burns, or the decay of a banana? The overall 
form, shape, range of motion, and impact on our senses of these 
works is quite clear. All are “fixed” in our minds and the memory 
lasts for a significant period of time. It is not like a car speeding 
along a thruway that has no artistic pretensions. The intention of the 
creators is clearly aesthetic. It is better policy—both from the 
wording of the fixation definition and from aesthetic notions of 
artmaking not to treat the word “fixed” to mean unchanging. This is 
clear when considering the Van Gogh paintings. As with much of 
the artistic world, the outer limits of the word’s meaning must be 
related, not only to the intentions of the artist but also to the human 
mind’s capacity to perceive what is happening within a defined 
range of action. 
Deeply important changes in our physical perceptions and 
understandings of the world can help us understand why Eliasson’s 
Waterfalls and Rauschenberg’s Mud Muse were fixed in a tangible 
medium of expression. The mathematical and scientific concept of 
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“chaos” is an important analogy. In the scientific context, “chaos”  
signifies a phenomenon that visually appears random but responds 
to established mathematical limits that vary in outcome depending 
on even very slight differences in initial conditions.156 Chaotic 
processes often are bounded in their outer limits despite our inability 
to predict exactly what will happen next.157 In many ways, chaos 
defines art works like those displaying water descending from the 
top of a structure or bubbles percolating in a vat. A camera, or even 
our brains, can capture any moment, but we cannot predict precisely 
what will happen next. 
Given “chaos’s” inherent natural variability, the well-defined 
nature of the mathematical concept, and the ability to capture any 
particular moment—why not allow an artistic use of bounded 
randomness, in addition to items that appear stable at the moment of 
viewing, to be fixed? The underlying artistic intention is just as 
inventive, creative, and perceptible—maybe more so—as it is in art 
works generally deemed “stable” despite their changing charac-
teristics. Eliasson’s water structures and Rauschenberg’s Mud Muse 
should be deemed copyrightable as changing, but bounded, works. 
They are among the most inventive and unusual works in the history 
of contemporary art. It would be unacceptable to allow anyone to 
come along and freely duplicate their work. 
These ideas strongly suggest that Kelley v. Chicago Park 
District158 was incorrectly decided.159 The Court of Appeals for  
the Seventh Circuit concluded that the garden Wildflower Works  
was not eligible for copyright protection on authorship and fixation 
grounds.160 Designed by Chapman Kelley for Grant Park in Chi-
cago, the garden included carefully selected, seasonal wildflowers 
 
156 See generally JAMES GLEICK, CHAOS: MAKING A NEW SCIENCE (2008); see also 
Jonathan Borwein & Michael Rose, Explainer: What is Chaos Theory?, THE 
CONVERSATION (Nov. 18, 2012, 10:20 PM), https://theconversation.com/explainer-what-
is-chaos-theory-10620 [https://perma.cc/GX5J-CMT7]. 
157 See id. 
158 635 F.3d 290 (7th Cir. 2011). 
159 Others also have suggested that the court was wrong. See Leung, supra note 132132, 
at 16–18, 20–30; Michelle Chatelain, Copyright Protection of a Garden: Kelley v. Chicago 
Park District Holds that Gardens Are Not Artwork Subject to Intellectual Property 
Protection, 14 TUL. J. TECH. & INTELL. PROP. 385, 392–94 (2011). 
160 See Kelley, 635 F.3d at 306. 
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planted in distinct and limited plots.161 The court noted that author-
ship must entirely be a result of human endeavor and fixation must 
be authored.162 The growth of plant life, the court said, was not 
authored but “planted and cultivated;” and its growth and change 
over time reduced stability to the point of breaking fixation.163 
While diagrams and plans for the garden were protected, the garden 
itself was neither a product of an author nor a fixed work.164  
The court’s result barred Kelley from making moral rights claims 
when the park district tore up the garden to implement a different 
landscape plan.165 
The conclusions about both authorship and fixation in Kelley 
were deeply wrong. The basic idea of the garden was not only laid 
out in “authored” planning documents, but also dutifully maintained 
within set limits and planting schedules by volunteers working 
under park authority issued permits.166 Just as Rauschenberg’s  
Mud Muse and Eliasson’s artificial waterfalls were confined  
within bounded limits, so too was the garden confined within  
established planting boundary lines, growing seasons, and color 
arrangements.167 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
161 Id. at 293. 
162 Id. at 303–04. 
163 Id. at 304. 
164 Id. at 305. 
165 Id. at 306. 
166 Id. at 294. The permits eventually expired but maintenance of the installation was 
allowed to continue without formal permits. 
167 Id. at 292–93. 
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 The court’s line drawing in Kelley was therefore improper. The 
trial court made analogies to Calder mobiles and Jeff Koons’ 
Puppy,168 pictured above.169 Unfortunately, both comparisons were 
deemed inapposite by the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals: 
Though not addressing the requirement of fixation 
directly, the district court compared Wildflower 
Works to “[t]he mobiles of Alexander Calder” and 
“Jeff Koons’ ‘Puppy,’ a 43–foot flowering topiary.” 
These analogies are also inapt. Although the 
aesthetic effect of a Calder mobile is attributable in 
part to its subtle movement in response to air 
currents, the mobile itself is obviously fixed and 
stable. In “Puppy” the artist assembled a huge metal 
frame in the shape of a puppy and covered it with 
thousands of blooming flowers sustained by an 
irrigation system within the frame. This may be 
 
168 Id.at 305. 
169 The author took this picture while visiting the Guggenheim Museum Bilbao in June 
2006, while the Koons piece was temporarily installed in front of the museum. 
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sufficient fixation for copyright (we venture no 
opinion on the question), but Wildflower Works  
is quite different. It is quintessentially a garden; 
“Puppy” is not.170 
Denying the centrality of motion to the widespread appeal of 
Calder mobiles misses the primary thrust of those works. Motion is 
intrinsic to Calder’s expressive drive171 and cannot blithely be 
dismissed as lacking authorship or fixation. The same is true of 
Koons’ Puppy. Creating a huge, playful figure with irrigated, 
flowering pots over its entire surface was what gave the piece its 
aura of friskiness, change, and humor.172 The flowers were not a 
minor part of the scheme; they were central to the aesthetic goals. 
Motion and change are the heart and soul of both the authorship and 
the sufficiently stable fixation within bounded limits of both the 
Calder and Koons works, as well as Kelley’s garden. 
What about Banksy’s shredding prank? Rather than presenting 
a constant process of bounded change, the decisive alteration in the 
original two-dimensional work was sudden, surprising, and totally 
unexpected.173 There was nothing subtle or gradual about it. At the 
conclusion of the bidding, someone from Banksy’s shop used a 
remote control to activate the shredder buried in the frame of the art, 
cutting the two-dimensional artwork into strips running about 
halfway up the piece, and leaving the strips hanging out of the 
bottom of the frame.174 This only took a few seconds.175 Girl with 
Balloon suddenly was transformed before a live audience. Video of 
the event displays a variety of audience reactions—laughter, 
 
170 Kelley, 635 F.3d at 305–06 (citations omitted). 
171 See Rachel Corbett, What Alexander Calder Understood About Joy: America’s 
Greatest Sculptor Gave Objects a Playful Life of Their Own, THE ATLANTIC (May 2020), 
https://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive//05/alexander-calder-jed-perl/609100/Jul 
[https://perma.cc/P2MU-NQ7D]. 
172 See At the Guggenheim Museum Bilbao, Jeff Koons’ Puppy Gets a Colorful New Coat, 
GUGGENHEIM: NEWS (June 21, 2018), https://www.guggenheim.org/news/bilbao-jeff-
koons-puppy[https://perma.cc/Z6N5-JS55]. 
173 See Kumparak, supra note 136. 
174 Id. 
175 Id. 
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amazement, surprise, horror, and disbelief.176 The half-shredded 
work eventually was renamed, authenticated by Banksy’s Pest 
Control website as a new work entitled Love is in the Bin, and 
accepted by the winning auction bidder for the same price she 
offered for Girl with Balloon.177 There was a virtually dichotomous 
before and after. The after was dramatically changed in appearance 
and form from the before. Putting aside the possible tort causes of 
action that the auction winner may have had for damage to her 
property,178 two different art works were at issue. Each was original 
and fixed. But what about the presence and use of the shredder inside 
the frame? Was that integral to the original fixation of either or both 
works? The shredder surely was fixed in a tangible medium—either 
by thinking of the physical shredder itself or its placement inside the 
frame. That was so for both the before and the after. 
Below is an image of the half-shredded work.179 After the 
auction Banksy released a video of the shredder being installed 
inside the frame of Girl with Balloon.180 An image from the video is 
below.181
 
Another Banksy video showed a test of the system in 
which an image was completely shredded.182 It is therefore possible 
that the device malfunctioned at Sotheby’s. Or perhaps the shredder 
was turned off using a remote control, or maybe never intended to 
 
176 Banksy Painting ‘Self-Destructs’ After Sotheby’s Sale, CNBC (Oct. 8, 2018, 12:20 
PM), https://www.cnbc.com/video/2018/10/08/banksy-painting-self-destructs-after-
sothebys-sale.html [https://perma.cc/N26N-53JY]. 
177 See Scott Reyburn, Winning Bidder for Shredded Banksy Says She’ll Keep It, N.Y. 
TIMES (Oct. 11, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/10/11/arts/design/winning-bidder-
for-shredded-banksy-painting-says-shell-keep-it.html [https://perma.cc/DGB5-829A]. 
178 The standard auction rule is that property ownership shifts at the banging of the gavel 
at the end of bidding. See U.C.C. § 2–328(2) (AM. LAW INST. & UNIF. LAW COMM’N 2002); 
Tichy, supra note 5.  
179 Jonathan Jones, What Happened Next? How Banksy’s Shredder Proved He Is a 
Serious, Important Artist, THE GUARDIAN (Dec. 18, 2018, 1:00 PM), 
https://www.theguardian.com/news/2018/dec/18/banksy-self-destructing-masterpiece-
prank-important-artist [https://perma.cc/WKS6-THHL]. 
180 Bendor Grosvenor, Shredding Banksy, ART HIST. NEWS (Oct. 8, 2018), 
https://www.arthistorynews.com/articles/5303_Shredding_Banksy [https://perma.cc/QK 
Y2-VU34]. 
181 Id. 
182 Banksy Reveals He to Shred Entire £1m Girl with Balloon Painting, SKY NEWS (Oct. 
18, 2018, 12:20 PM), https://news.sky.com/story/banksy-reveals-he-meant-to-shred-
entire-1m-girl-with-balloon-painting-11528598 [https://perma.cc/U2XQ-ZB6Q]. 
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fully shred the work in public. If the shredder was turned off, can  
it be reactivated at a later date?183 What were the consequences for 
copyrightability? Certainly, the before and after versions were fixed 
in a tangible medium of expression. But what was and is the status 
of the shredder? Was that mechanical device part of an item of 
protectable “art?” 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
III. PICTORIAL, GRAPHIC, AND SCULPTURAL WORKS: SHREDDERS 
Copyright terms of art are notoriously flexible and subject to 
interpretation, even when defined in the Act. This is clearly revealed 
in the previous discussion of originality and fixation.184 It is also true 
 
183 See id. 
184 See supra Parts I–II. 
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with copyrightable works styled as “pictorial, graphic, and sculp-
tural works.” On its face, the definition is slippery and puzzling: 
“Pictorial, graphic, and sculptural works” include 
two-dimensional and three-dimensional works of 
fine, graphic, and applied art, photographs, prints and 
art reproductions, maps, globes, charts, diagrams, 
models, and technical drawings, including archi-
tectural plans. Such works shall include works of 
artistic craftsmanship insofar as their form but not 
their mechanical or utilitarian aspects are concerned; 
the design of a useful article, as defined in this 
section, shall be considered a pictorial, graphic, or 
sculptural work only if, and only to the extent that, 
such design incorporates pictorial, graphic, or 
sculptural features that can be identified separately 
from, and are capable of existing independently of, 
the utilitarian aspects of the article.185 
The definition of a “useful article” also has its ambiguities: 
A “useful article” is an article having an intrinsic 
utilitarian function that is not merely to portray the 
appearance of the article or to convey information. 
An article that is normally a part of a useful article is 
considered a “useful article”.186 
In combination, these code provisions place Banksy’s shredder 
in an interesting, indefinite, and perhaps unique, position. While the 
original Girl with Balloon and the post-shredding Love is in the Bin 
compositions are clearly works of fine art, the statutory definitions 
leave the shredder in an ambiguous place. After insertion in the 
frame, the shredder certainly lost whatever intrinsic utilitarian 
function it once had as a device for protecting access to private 
information, though it does retain at least some of its status as a 
mechanical device. This may or may not allow it to be treated as part 
of the art object. If the shredder is part of the “form” of the artistic 
endeavors, rather than simply a “mechanical or utilitarian aspect” of 
 
185 17 U.S.C. § 101. 
186 Id. 
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the works, then it might be considered an aspect of the fine art.  
But it also may easily be considered an aspect separable from the 
two-dimensional before and after works, and therefore not part of 
the protected pictorial creations. It may simply be analogous to a 
paintbrush—an implement used to create a work rather than an 
artistic element of the work. It is important to know whether the 
shredder is part of the artistic work. If the auction winner elects to 
remove the device from the frame, would that be a mutilation of a 
work of fine art and therefore a possible moral right violation?187  
If the shredder can be reactivated by use of a remote control, what 
are the consequences of deactivating any part of the shredder device 
that might receive a remote signal in the future? 
So, what is the shredder? Compare it first to Alexander Calder’s 
Circus, constructed between 1926 and 1931 and sometimes on 
display at the Whitney Museum of Art in New York City, the  
work’s owner.188 The Circus is an elaborate set of circus characters 
and “acts” that can be animated by hand like children’s toys.189  
Even the trapeze artists can be sent swinging.190 It is much like a 
dance performance, only the performances involve human 
interaction. The similarity between Calder’s work and choreo-
graphy, all by itself, strongly suggests that works by the master  
of mechanical movements should be protected.191 The art world 
 
187 See 17 U.S.C. § 106A. 
188 The image below is from Calder’s Circus by Alexander Calder, available at WHITNEY 
MUSEUM OF AM. ART, https://whitney.org/collection/works/5488[https://perma.cc/D3RE-
38FX]. Visit Alexander Calder, Calder’s Circus, 1926-31, WHITNEY MUSEUM OF AM. ART 
at https://www.whitney.org/WatchAndListen/1094 [https://perma.cc/E5FM-GVKK] for a 
video about the work. 
189 A famous video in the Whitney Museum collection captures Calder “playing” with 
the circus. Whitney Museum of Am. Art, Alexander Calder performs his “Circus”, 
YOUTUBE (Oct. 23, 2008), https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=t6jwnu8Izy0 
[https://perma.cc/A25C-UBB9]. However, the circus has rarely been “played” with 
recently because of the fragility of the sculpture. Conserving Calder’s Circus, WHITNEY 
MUSEUM OF AM. ART (May 22, 2013), https://whitney.org/media/299 
[https://perma.cc/8DJT-PEW9]. 
190 Alexander Calder performs his “Circus”, infra note 193. 
191 The Copyright Act specifically lists choreographic works as a category of 
copyrightable subject matter. 17 U.S.C. § 102(a)(4). 
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certainly considers this work to be an elaborate sculptural work,192 
whether it is sit-ting still or suddenly activated by humans. Indeed, 
it is considered a major artistic breakthrough, allowing moving 
objects to be considered as first-rate creative projects. Calder began 
to fabricate mobiles just after he made the Circus.193 It is an early 
example of a now large genre known as kinetic art.194 His mobiles, 
of course, are in the same category, as are Eliasson’s Waterfalls and 
Rauschenberg’s mud bubbles.195 
In each setting, similar questions can be posed about whether the 
mechanical aspects of the works are part of the protected pictorial, 
graphic, or sculptural creations. Most of the mechanisms are not 
separable from the rest of the art. They energize the works. Without 
them the circus, waterfalls, and mud vat would be wholly different 
from the items seen by the public. Mechanical devices were intrinsic 
to the function, aesthetics, and appearance of each work. Removing 
them would have effectively destroyed the reasons for their creation. 
Can that be said of the shredder? 
Yes and no. It depends on how one defines the original work. 
Before the shredding occurred, the work appeared as permanent and 
unchangeable, as prints typically are. Banksy, however, always saw 
the piece as alterable, if not destructible.196 Whose perception does 
copyright law privilege?197 Given the basic run of ideas suggested to 
this point in the Article, artistic intention likely controls the 
 
192 See Corbett, supra note 171. See also Adam Gopnik, How Alexander Calder Made 
Art Move, THE NEW YORKER (Nov. 27, 2017), https://www.newyorker.com/ 
magazine/2017/12/04/how-alexander-calder-made-art-move [https://perma.cc/GYX2-
7ZRD]. 
193 See Calder’s Work, CALDER FOUNDATION, http://www.calder.org/work/by-life-
period/1898-1925 [https://perma.cc/AP9H-SN2S]. 
194 See, e.g., Jessica Stewart, Art History: The Evolution of Hypnotic Kinetic Sculptures, 
MY MODERN MET (Mar. 27, 2017), https://mymodernmet.com/kinetic-sculpture-art-
history/ [ttps://perma.cc/8E3E-M3U6]. 
195 Id. 
196 See Grosvenor, supra, note 180. 
197 Tort and copyright law may value different intents. The purchaser of the art may be 
valued by tort law, but not necessarily in copyright law which pays a great deal of attention 
to artistic intentions. 
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“definition” of what the work was at its creation.198 From Banksy’s 
perspective, he clearly intended to see the work as “kinetic” if it was 
put on the auction block. It was his pranksterish way of commenting 
on the economic and cultural impact of the art marketplace of the 
wealthy. He explicitly said so in the video showing the installation 
of the device.199 The shredder was intrinsic in the nature of the work 
as Banksy conceived it. And, of course, it still may be. For copyright 
purposes, it is very similar to Duchamp’s Fountain, Rauschenberg’s 
Canyon, or his Mud Muse. In each of these settings, the artists  
took utilitarian or non-artistic objects and intentionally integrated 
them into artistic creations. The works were another way of com-
menting on temporality and permanence, stability and instability, 
and life and death. 
Banksy here placed himself in the same genre as Cattelan and 
Fischer. The invisibility of the shredder to the public did not reduce 
its role in aesthetic judgments Banksy made when he integrated it 
into the inherent nature of the work. Nor did the invisibility of most 
of the bubbling system in Rauschenberg’s work. They therefore 
must be considered as part and parcel of the works in which they sat. 
And it also must be considered as a critical aspect of the two- or 
three-dimensional works as defined in the Copyright Act. The 
shredder is, in fact, both inseparable from Banksy’s compositional 
efforts and totally lacking in utility. Recall that a work of utility is 
defined in the Act as “an article having an intrinsic utilitarian 
function that is not merely to portray the appearance of the article or 
to convey information.”200 Once installed, the shredder had no 
intrinsic utilitarian function nor did it merely portray the work or 
convey information. Rather, it was an instrument of creativity that 
operated at the behest of the artist or one of his agents. 
 
198 See supra Part I. Recall the Hindenburg Disaster disputes in which the book author’s 
labeling of his book as history cemented its base conceit as historical. See Hoehling v. 
Universal City Studios, Inc., 618 F.2d 972, 975–76 (2d Cir. 1980). 
199 See Grosvenor, supra note 180. 
200 17 U.S.C. § 101. 
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IV. MORAL RIGHTS: BANANAS AND SHREDDERS 
The three main works framing the core of this Article by 
Duchamp, Cattalan, and Banksy included elements of a moral rights 
problem. Each piece was completely or partially destroyed, or 
permanently lost to later generations. Art history has its share of 
tragedy, humor, and good clean fun! After a lengthy dispute over 
whether The Fountain should be shown at the first exhibition of The 
American Society of Independent Artists in 1917, it was refused 
entry, set up in the studio of the famous American photographer, 
Alfred Stieglitz, and photographed.201 The urinal disappeared not 
long after the session with Stieglitz and has not been seen since.202 
The exact story of its disappearance is still a mystery.203 During the 
1950s and 1960s, Duchamp authorized the creation of a series of 
replicas.204 These replicas are now scattered in important museums 
around the world.205 As discussed, Banksy’s shredder partially 
destroyed a work of art. That event created one of the largest, if not 
the greatest, art uproar of this young century. 
Uproars continued apace when Cattelan’s The Comedian was 
taken off an exhibition wall and eaten by David Datuna.206 Only  
the last event may raise issues under provisions of the Visual Art-
ists Rights Act, America’s moral rights statute.207 The Fountain 
disappeared well before the act was adopted in 1990.208 The Banksy 
shredding event occurred at Sotheby’s auction house in London,209 
 
201 Marcel Duchamp and the Fountain Scandal, PHILA. MUSEUM OF ART (Mar. 27, 2017),  
[https://perma.cc/7A7V-4RYV]. 
202 Id. 
203 For a detailed history and analysis of The Fountain, see generally Camfield, supra 
note 60. For the definitive biography of Duchamp, see CALVIN TOMKINS, DUCHAMP: A 
BIOGRAPHY, 182–84 (2014). Tomkins’ book is an edited and revised version of the original 
edition published in 1996 by the Museum of Modern Art. 
204 See The Fascinating Tale of Marcel Duchamp’s Fountain, supra note 1.  
205 See id. The Tate Modern in London, for example, has one of the replicas. See Marcel 
Duchamp, Fountain, TATE MOD., https://www.tate.org.uk/art/artworks/duchamp-fountain-
t07573[https://perma.cc/4GUW-7EFR]. 
206 See Pogrebin, supra note 2. 
207 See 17 U.S.C. § 106A. 
208 The Visual Artists Rights Act was adopted by Congress in 1990. Visual Artists Rights 
Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101–650, § 603 603(a) (Dec. 1, 1990), 104 Stat. 5128 (Dec. 1, 
1990) (codified at 17 U.S.C. § 106A). 
209 See Kumparak, supra note 136. 
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outside the jurisdiction of United States intellectual property law. 
Datuna’s gustatory destruction of Cattelan’s banana, however, 
occurred at Art Basel in Miami in 2019.210 But, just to expand the 
example base, the issues arising in all three cases are considered here 
despite the inapplicability of the statute in two of the settings. 
The moral rights statute has not been a frequent subject of 
judicial analysis since its adoption in 1990. One of the most 
important judicial disputes arose over the 2014 demise of the 
5Pointz aerosol art complex in Long Island City, Queens.211 Gerald 
Wolkoff, the primary owner of the complex, destroyed nearly all of 
the works at the complex over twenty years after he first allowed 
street artists to paint at the old industrial site.212 That event was 
eerily similar to the disappearance of Duchamp’s Fountain—here 
today, gone tomorrow. Shortly after the artists failed to obtain a 
preliminary injunction barring destruction of the buildings, the 
owner had virtually all of the art whitewashed in a burst of 
chutzpah.213 Doing so aggravated the court and cut off additional 
efforts to enjoin the demolition. The plaintiffs later won a substantial 
six and three-quarter million-dollar judgment.214 The Court of 
Appeals for the Second Circuit affirmed that result in 2020.215  
Though Duchamp’s urinal and the art at 5Pointz both 
disappeared from public view, important differences existed. As the 
litigation made clear, 5Pointz was destroyed over the strenuous 
objections of the aerosol art community that created the 
internationally renowned site.216 But there is a mystery about the 
 
210 See Pogrebin, supra note 2. 
211 For a lengthy piece on the history of 5Pointz and the litigation over its destruction, 
see Chused, supra note 84.  
212 Alan Feuer, Graffiti Artists Awarded $6.7 Million for Destroyed 5Pointz Murals, N.Y. 
TIMES (Feb. 12, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/02/12/nyregion/5pointz-graffiti-
judgment.html [https://perma.cc/GM9X-SXMQ]. 
213 Id. 
214 Id. 
215 Castillo v. G&M Realty L.P., 950 F.3d 155, 173 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 2020 WL 
5883324 (Oct. 5, 2020)215. 
For a detailed discussion, see also an analysis of the oral argument; see also Amanda 
Ottaway, Graffiti-Whitewash Appeal Lands with a Thud at 2nd Circuit, COURTHOUSE 
NEWS SERVICE (Aug. 30, 2019), https://www.courthousenews.com/graffiti-whitewash-
appeal-lands-with-thud-at-2nd-circuit/ [https://perma.cc/HGL9-CA2X]. 
216 Castillo, 950 F.3d at 164. 
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motivations of those who caused the disappearance of The 
Fountain.217 The public does not know what happened to the piece 
nor whether Duchamp had anything to do with or knowledge of the 
event. Not only did it occur well before the United States adopted 
any moral rights provisions, but it is possible that its disappearance 
was at the behest of or with the consent of Duchamp—a conclusion 
that would preclude a moral right claim altogether. 
A similar problem arises with Banksy’s shredder. Though the 
object was owned by someone else at the time of its partial 
destruction, the artist was responsible for the modification of the 
work. The statute provides artists with a cause of action for muti-
lation or destruction by someone else, but not by themselves.218 
While there are fascinating issues that would arise if the shredder 
was altered or removed from Love is in the Bin by the owner, there 
were no moral right claims for the events at Sotheby’s. 
David Datuna, as noted several times, ate Maurizio Cattelan’s 
banana.219 Was that action covered by the moral right scheme? Was 
it a mutilation or simply a speeding up of the inevitable? Was it a 
destructive event or simply a removal of one banana for its 
inevitable replacement by another? Note that the instruction set for 
The Comedian suggests that the banana be changed every seven to 
ten days.220 Was Datuna, in an odd sense, part of the artistic project? 
Perhaps. Emanuel Perrotin, Cattelan’s gallerist, even took one of the 
bananas off the wall himself and ate it!221 He is reported as saying, 
“Maurizio, it’s a good banana, I have to say.”222 He went on to claim 
that in the absence of a certificate of authenticity, anyone removing 
a banana without paying the price owns nothing except a banana. 
Destructibility, or at least decay, was part and parcel of the 
undertaking but an “owner” had to buy the right to tape a banana to 
a wall in accordance with Cattelan’s instructions. 
 
217 TOMKINS, supra note 203, at 182–84. 
218 See 17 U.S.C. § 106A(a)(3). This, of course, says nothing about the applicability of 
the tort system. 
219 See Pogrebin, supra note 2. 
220 See E-mail from Katherine Wisniewski, supra note 85. 
221 Picheta, supra note 98.  
222 Id. 
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Conceptual art of this sort creates an especially difficult set of 
ownership and moral rights problems.223 The provision most appli-
cable to the Cattelan/Datuna escapade is 17 U.S.C § 106A(a)(3): 
(a) Rights of Attribution and Integrity.— [T]he 
author of a work of visual art224 . . . 
(3) [S]hall have the right— 
(A) to prevent any intentional distortion, 
mutilation, or other modification of that work 
which would be prejudicial to his or her 
honor or reputation, and any intentional 
distortion, mutilation, or modification of that 
work is a violation of that right, and 
(B) to prevent any destruction of a work of 
recognized stature, and any intentional or 
grossly negligent destruction of that work is 
a violation of that right.225 
Did Datuna violate these provisions? Did he mutilate, modify, 
or destroy Comedian? If we take seriously Perrotin’s statement 
about the banana itself not being a work of art until a price is  
paid for a certificate of authenticity, then Datuna simply enjoyed a  
nice repast. He didn’t destroy anything of significance. If, however,  
we consider every instance of Cattelan’s Comedian installed in 
accordance with the certificate of authenticity and the instructions 
 
223 For a lengthy review of the copyright and moral rights issues that arise with the works 
of Sol LeWitt, see generally Chused, “Temporary” Conceptual Art, supra note 84. 
224 The Act defines the term “work of visual art” in a way that severely limits the coverage 
of American moral right law. 17 U.S.C. § 101 provides: 
A “work of visual art” is— 
(1) a painting, drawing, print, or sculpture, existing in a single copy, in 
a limited edition of 200 copies or fewer that are signed and 
consecutively numbered by the author, or, in the case of a sculpture, in 
multiple cast, carved, or fabricated sculptures of 200 or fewer that are 
consecutively numbered by the author and bear the signature or other 
identifying mark of the author; or 
(2) a still photographic image produced for exhibition purposes only, 
existing in a single copy that is signed by the author, or in a limited 
edition of 200 copies or fewer that are signed and consecutively 
numbered by the author. 
225 17 U.S.C. § 106A(a)(3). 
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conveyed as part of each sale of the work, then Datuna did destroy 
a work of visual art. 
As noted in Part II(A), the installed version of Cattelan’s The 
Comedian was a derivative work in its own right.226 In reality, each 
installed version of the work is likely to be different from any other 
in some way—perhaps another wall, a new banana, a distinct spool 
of tape, a slightly altered angle on the wall, a unique banana color, 
an unpredictable speed of decay, or a unique atmosphere with new 
lighting, wall color, nearby works, gallery or museum, or moment 
when a rotten banana is exchanged for a fresh one. But most 
importantly for purposes of this Article, the fact that the banana 
constantly decays does not remove the possibility that taking down 
the banana and eating it is a destructive or mutilating act. Since one 
interesting feature of this particular work is witnessing its decay, 
interrupting that process is a destructive intervention in the artistic 
process on display. It is virtually the same as destroying a work in a 
temporary installation made of fairly permanent materials before the 
projected closing date for the show. In both cases the temporality of 
the art is dramatically interrupted. Indeed, this was one of the major 
holdings in the 5Pointz litigation.227 The sudden destruction of the 
work, even though it all was destined to be destroyed at some point 
in the future, was still deemed a malicious interference with moral 
rights. Here, Datuna interrupted the expected seven- to ten-day life 
of the banana and destroyed the temporal intentions of Cattelan. 
While this Article was in draft stage, the Museum of Modern Art 
in New York City temporarily showed photographs by Dorothea 
Lange.228 If someone walked in and smashed one of the pictures, 
that would surely be an act of destruction despite the fact that the 
show was temporary. If the same museum held a temporary 
exhibition of rotting bananas put up and maintained by Cattelan and 
someone took and ate one of the pieces of fruit, it would for moral 
right purposes be no different from the destruction of a Lange image. 
 
226 See supra notes 111–114 and accompanying text.193 
227 Castillo v. G&M Realty L.P., 950 F.3d 155, 167–69 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 2020 WL 
5883324 (Oct. 5, 2020)215. 
228 See Dorothea Lange, Pictures and Words, in MUSEUM OF MOD. ART, 
https://www.moma.org/calendar/exhibitions/5079 [https://perma.cc/B774-TREQ]. 
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And that reality would not be altered by the ability to make another 
copy of the photograph if the original negative still exists.229 
This conclusion about The Comedian, however, does not answer 
the moral rights problems associated with Banksy’s shredder. If I 
am correct that the shredder must be considered part and parcel of 
the before and after works by Banksy, removing or altering it risks 
a moral rights claim. That move, of course, would not be made by 
Banksy but by the new owner of the half-shredded work. Similarly, 
if the new owner elected to restore the work to its original appear-
ance, that also might risk a moral rights claim. Since the shredder 
was an intrinsic part of Banksy’s intention to alter Girl with Balloon, 
making that intention impossible to put into effect again may create 
a problem. If it was Banksy’s intention to only partially shred his 
work at the Sotheby’s auction and finish the job if the piece ever 
went up for auction again, then removing the shredder significantly 
alters the work itself. 
These questions, of course, are deeply ironic, if not perverse. 
The owner of the new version, Love is in the Bin, may simply want 
to protect her investment from total destruction, even though total 
destruction may be an eager glimmer in Banksy’s eye if the piece is 
again put up for auction. One can assume that if anyone with a 
modicum of intelligence wished to bid on the piece now, they surely 
would wish to get assurance that the shredder cannot continue its 
destructive course. This would require that the back of the piece be 
opened up for viewing, that the shredder be inspected by an expert, 
and that it be deactivated or removed if necessary. 
It certainly is bizarre to conclude that removing the possibility 
of destruction is considered a mutilation or destruction of the 
underlying work itself. This is what generates the major contro-
versy. What should a court do if confronted with a dispute between 
a plaintiff’s plea to remove the possibility of a future damage to 
property tort claim and a defendant artist’s plea that to do so violates 
the moral right provisions of the Copyright Act? How should that 
 
229 This, of course, does not answer questions about the reduction in reputation or the 
recognized stature of a work as required in various parts of 17 U.S.C § 106A(a)(3). Nor 
does it refer to the moral rights provisions limiting protection of photographs to those made 
for purposes of exhibition in less than 200 copies. 
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balance be worked out? It would be odd if the plaintiff is not allowed 
to preclude destruction of a work she owns. But it would also be odd 
if an artist was barred from pursuing a claim that the owner was 
planning to mutilate or destroy a work of fine art. 
There is no obvious answer to this dilemma. Perhaps some sort 
of compromise is the best we can hope for. From the film of the 
shredding event posted by Banksy, it appears that the shredder was 
activated by a remote control. Using such a device requires the 
existence of some sort of signal receiving system in the artwork.  
If there is a small hole in the frame for passage of an infrared signal, 
why not allow the owner of the work to tape it over or plug the hole 
with an easily removable substance? Or, if the device requires a 
battery to remain active, what if the battery was simply removed? 
Or what if one wire was removed from a terminal or snipped?  
Would any of these be properly viewed as a mutilation or destruct-
tion? Or would it be a disturbance of Banksy’s intentions and there-
fore an act of mutilation? Perhaps it is best that this issue about the 
culture of art and law be left open for further thought. 
CONCLUSION 
Art is in a constant state of flux. Statutory language, however, 
does not change very frequently. Sometimes it lasts for decades.  
The Copyright Act of 1909 was not significantly rewritten until 
1976, more than forty years ago.230 It was during that time period 
that many major shifts occurred in the nature and content of work 
widely recognized as making important changes in the nature of art. 
Accommodating such changes requires at least three things. 
First, the language of statutes must contain enough “wiggle room” 
to give judges some flexibility in how they approach new problems 
as they arise. Second, there must be active judges who understand 
the art world and think deeply about how statutory language may be 
used to address new developments. And, finally, it is critical that 
judges fully absorb the now classic contention of Justice Oliver 
Wendell Holmes that courts are improper forums for resolving 
 
230 For a summary of the Copyright Act’s history, see JULIE E. COHEN ET AL., COPYRIGHT 
IN A GLOBAL INFORMATION ECONOMY, 5TH ED. 28–29 (2020). 
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debates about the quality and importance of new artistic endeavors. 
That must be left to society at large.231 Considered together these 
three receptors for intelligent use of the Copyright Act are the crux 
of this Article. 
It is not important whether readers fully agree with the premises. 
The only critical matter is that readers are open minded about the 
flexibility of words in the existing statute, willing to educate 
thoughtful judges about ways they can consider new uses of old 
words, and prepared to think about the ways in which artistic move-
ments may be integrated into existing legal system in non-traumatic 
ways. Hopefully, this Article produces such results. 
 
 
231 See Bleistein v. Donaldson Lithographing Co., 188 U.S. 239, 252–53 (1903). There, 
Holmes noted that: 
It would be a dangerous undertaking for persons trained only to the 
law to constitute themselves final judges of the worth of pictorial 
illustrations, outside of the narrowest and most obvious limits. At the 
one extreme some works of genius would be sure to miss appreciation. 
Their very novelty would make them repulsive until the public had 
learned the new language in which their author spoke. It may be more 
than doubted, for instance, whether the etchings of Goya or the 
paintings of Manet would have been sure of protection when seen for 
the first time. At the other end, copyright would be denied to pictures 
which appealed to a public less educated than the judge. Yet if they 
command the interest of any public, they have a commercial value-it 
would be bold to say that they have not an aesthetic and educational 
value-and the taste of any public is not to be treated with contempt. It 
is an ultimate fact for the moment, whatever may be our hopes for a 
change. That these pictures had their worth and their success is 
sufficiently shown by the desire to reproduce them without regard to 
the plaintiffs’ rights. 
Id. 
